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1. Background 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In the early 1950s, before container shipping was even a concept, most of the world’s 
great centers of commerce had docks at their heart. Freight transportation was an urban 
industry, employing millions of people who drove, dragged, or pushed cargo through city 
streets to or from the piers. On the waterfront itself, swarms of workers clambered up 
gangplanks with loads on their backs or toiled deep in the holds of ships, stowing boxes 
and barrels in every available corner. Warehouses stood at the heads of many of the 
wharves, and where there were no warehouses, there were factories. As they had for 
centuries, manufacturers still clustered near the docks for easier delivery of raw materials 
and faster shipment of finished goods. Whether in San Francisco or Montreal, Hamburg 
or London, Rio or Buenos Aires, the surrounding neighborhoods were filled with 
households that made their livings from the port, bound together by the special nature of 
waterfront work and the unique culture that developed from it (Levinson 2006).  
 
Then something revolutionary happens. The world made a box, - a soulless aluminum 
box held together with welds and rivets, with a wooden floor and two enormous doors at 
one end. The box soon became the core of a highly automated system for moving goods 
from one place to another, with a minimum of cost and complication on the way. Cities 
that had been centers of maritime commerce for centuries saw their waterfront decline 
with startling speed, unsuited to the container trade or simply unneeded (Levinson 2006). 
The manufacturers that endured high costs and antiquated urban plants in order to be near 
their suppliers and their customers have long since moved away, and venerable ship lines 
with century-old pedigrees were crushed by the enormous cost of adapting to container 
shipping.  
Decades later, when enormous trailer trucks rule the highways and trains hauling nothing 
but sacks of boxes rumble through the night, it is hard to fathom how much the container 
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has changed the world. A 35-ton container of coffeemakers can leave a factory in 
Malaysia, be loaded aboard a ship, and cover 9,000 miles to Los Angeles in 16 days. A 
day later, the container is on a unit train to Chicago, where it is transferred immediately 
to a truck headed for Cincinnati at a cost lower than a single first-class air ticket. More 
than likely, no one has touched the contents, or even opened the container along the way.  
The modern container port has become a factory in which intricate movements required 
to service mammoth oceangoing vessels is choreographed by a computer long before the 
ship arrives; trains carry nothing but double-stacked containers roll into inter-modal 
terminal close to the dock; and giant cranes, -long enough to span the width of a ship 
broader than the Panama Canal-, work their way along as they remove one container after 
another. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: On-dock-rail, the Port of Vancouver 
Source: The Port of Vancouver 
 
As parts of the ship are cleared of incoming containers, reloading begins, and dockside 
activity becomes even more frenzied (Levison 2006); each time the crane places an 
incoming container on one railcar, it picks up an outbound container from another, 
simultaneously emptying and filling up the ship. “The colorful chaos of the old-time pier 
is nowhere in evidence at the major container terminal” (2006:5-6).  
Yet getting from the Ideal-X to a system that moves tens of millions of boxes each year 
was not an easy voyage. Both the container’s promoters and its opponents sensed from 
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the very beginning that this was an invention that could change the way the world works. 
That first container voyage of 1956, an idea turned into reality by the ceaseless drive of 
an entrepreneur who knew nothing about ships, unleashed more than a decade of battle 
around the world. Powerful labor leaders pulled out all the stops to block its ascent. Some 
ports spent heavily to promote it; others spent enormous sums for traditional piers and 
warehouses in the vain hope that the utilitarian object (the container) would prove a 
passing fad. What is it, then, about the container cargo business that makes it so vital for 
the world economy? Surely not the thing itself.  
 
In what follows a brief overview of research object will be given, that is, how Canada’s 
largest and most diversified federal port in North America, the Port of Vancouver, 
responds to the new age of containerization.  
 
 
1.2 The Port of Vancouver 
 
 
Before us lies tremendous potential to capture economic growth and prosperity as a result of 
increasing Asia-Pacific trade […] and the Port of Vancouver is uniquely positioned to harness 
opportunities as a result. However, capturing the tremendous economic potential requires a good 
plan and the support of our communities and all levels of government 
 
 
Captain Gordon Houston 
Vancouver Port Authority 2005 
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1.2.1 The Situation 
The Port of Vancouver covers a vast geographic area in British Columbia’s1 Lower 
Mainland2. Eight municipalities border the water and land jurisdictions of the Port of 
Vancouver, as seen in Figure 1.2. The north and south arms of the Fraser River are 
managed by the other two port authorities in the Vancouver region; North Fraser Port 
Authority and Fraser River Port Authority, while Vancouver Port Authority (VPA) 
administers the lands and water that comprise the Port of Vancouver. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: The Port of Vancouver 
Source: Port of Vancouver Economic Impact Update, May 2005 
 
Greater Vancouver is home to one of the largest ports in North America and some of the 
most modern container terminals in the world, the Port of Vancouver. Every year, the 
Port of Vancouver trades approximately $43 billion with more than 90 economies, 
creates jobs for approximately 70,000 Canadians, contributes almost $4 billion to 
                                                 
1. British Columbia, often also referred to as B.C. , is the westernmost of Canada's provinces (Wikipedia). 
2. The Lower Mainland is the name that residents of British Columbia apply to the region surrounding the 
City of Vancouver (Wikipedia).  
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Canada's GDP, and generates $763 million in tax revenue. By working together to 
maximize the opportunities being presented, the Port hopes to triple its benefits within 15 
years (Vancouver Port Authority 2005). Increasing container trade with Asia, and 
specifically China, makes containers the Port of Vancouver’s fastest growing sector, - a 
growth which is not expected to subside significantly over the next two decades. 
Container handlings facilities on the Lower Mainland are, accordingly, being expanded 
and developed to capitalize on this major market opportunity and the considerable 
economic benefits it represent (Greater Vancouver Short-Sea Container Shipping Study). 
 
 
Figure 1.3: COSCO Vancouver 
Source: The Port of Vancouver.  
 
But at the same time the Port of Vancouver is at a crossroads. Despite their vast potential, 
Vancouver’s advantages are being jeopardized by freight congestion in the Lower 
Mainland, and alarming concerns about capacity to handle the projected trade growth 
over the next 20 years. Although a major road transportation improvement is planned on 
the Lower Mainland, trucking and railways companies are expected to face increasing 
challenges in the future to move containers in a timely manner and at reasonable rates. 
The need for an integrated multimodal transportation system that efficiently and safely 
moves goods and people while respecting the environment are for that reason highly 
critical if the Port of Vancouver wants to be a part of the global transportation game.  
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1.3 Why Study Seaport Clusters? 
 
A number of recent economic and technological developments in shipping, cargo 
handling and related value added services, as well as hinterland transportation has 
substantially changed the role of ports. The impact of these developments can be 
synthesized into two key elements (Hazendonck 2001). First, port user demands now 
force port authorities and port operators to increasingly take into account various 
‘integrated logistics chain’ objectives, that act as constraints on the port’s operations. 
Second, port authorities and port operators are increasingly stimulated to consider social 
objectives, such as a contribution to regional employment, an improved quality of 
environment, security and mobility. Declercq and Verbeke (1996) provide an interesting, 
albeit service, overview of some the economic and technological dynamics occurring in 
the port environment.  
 
The bottom line is that these developments have resulted in a more competitive 
environment to which port actors must respond almost continuously in a dynamic fashion 
in order to remain at par with rivals (see e.g. Heaver 1993, Goss 1990, Button 1993 and 
Stopford 1997).  
 
As port actors are affected by higher uncertainties and risks than ever before, the 
importance of formal strategic analysis has also increased, so as to obtain valuable 
insights on the evaluation of port competition and on the individual port’s or port actor’s 
position vis-à-vis rivals. Moreover, as many seaports have had to become more market-
oriented and seaport authorities as well as private port operators have been forced to 
develop efficiency based strategies, in-depth knowledge on the foundations of 
competitive advantage (Haezendonck 2001), i.e. port specific advantages, has become 
highly critical.  
 
Surprisingly, then, perhaps, is that the cluster concept, - defined as a regional 
concentration of related economic activities- (Krugman 1991), has hardly been used to 
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analyze seaports, even though port activities are geographically concentrated in a limited 
number of regions (de Langen 2004).  
 
Traditionally, a seaport was viewed as a transit area; a gateway through which goods and 
people move from and to the sea (Hazendonck 2001). As such, it was a place of contact 
between land and maritime space, a knot where ocean and inland transport lines meet and 
intertwine an inter-modal place of convergence (Weigend 1958, Hayuth 1985). But in the 
course of time, fundamental changing processes have broadened and deepened the 
functions of sea ports. Some sea ports have in fact grown out to become industrial 
complexes comprising a large number of related industrial activities. In more recent 
years, the logistical function of sea ports in particular has received much attention as the 
gateway position of major sea ports offers opportunities for the enhancement of value-
added logistics, that is, an integration of the production and distribution chain (OECD 
2000). By offering VAL services, ports aim to attract a large portion of the value-added 
creation within product chains. The modern sea port has in other words evolved from a 
pure transshipment centre to “a function in a logistics system” in a broader technological 
system (Hazendonck 2001). For this reason, then, ports can be regarded as ‘text-book 
cases’ of clustering as these regions attract substantial numbers of port related firms (see 
Fujita & Mori 1996) such as pilotage and towing service, distribution companies, haulers, 
manufacturers, forwarders and that like. See Chapter 6 for an in-depth rationale of this. It 
should be noted however that, especially in the regional economics literature, ports are 
usually studied as elements fully dependent on the larger system within they operate, 
typically an intercontinental, origin-destination logistics chain. The focus for this study, 
on the other hand, is not the entire logistics system, but precisely the port cluster as the 
critical hub and key component in that logistic chain. 
 
The functional and spatial development of sea ports is depicted in Table 1.1 (OECD 
2000; “Land Access to Seaports”). A distinction is made between elements related to the 
external environment, the functional organization, the spatial organization and port 
organization and strategy (Van den Berg & Van Klink 1994, World Bank 1992). 
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Table 1.1: Functional and spatial development of a sea port  
 
 First generation 
port 
Second generation 
port 
Third generation 
port 
Fourth generation 
port 
 
External environment 
Period of 
developments  
Before 1960s After 1960s After 1980s 2000 
Exogenous 
developments 
Colonization 
Steam ships 
Rise of nations 
Rise of trade 
Petro-chemistry 
Lorry and pipeline 
Structural prosperity 
Industrialization 
Multinationals 
Container 
Ecological protection 
Internationalization 
Global economy 
Information systems 
Environment 
Informatisation 
 
Functional  organization 
Port functions Transhipment (1) 
Storage (2) 
Trade (3) 
(1) to (3) + 
Industry (4) 
(1) to (4) + 
Distribution (5) 
(1) to (5) + 
Logistical 
control 
Production 
characteristics 
Cargo flow 
Simple service 
Low value-added 
Cargo flow 
Cargo transformation 
Combined services 
Improved value-
added 
Cargo information 
flow 
Cargo distribution 
Multiple service 
package 
High value-added 
(port oriented) 
Cargo information 
flow 
Cargo information 
distribution 
Multiple service 
package 
High value-added 
(network oriented) 
Chain management 
Type of cargo Break bulk cargo Break bulk and 
dry/liquid bulk 
Bulk and 
unitized/containerized 
cargo 
General 
cargo/containers 
 
Spatial organization 
Spatial expansion 
of port 
Quay and waterfront 
area 
Enlarged port area Terminals and 
distribelt towards 
landside 
Network-related 
functional expansion 
Principal locational 
factors 
Presence of market 
Availability of 
labour 
Access to raw 
materials 
Access to sales 
markets 
Availability of 
capital 
Availability of 
transshipment 
facilities 
Access to sales 
market 
Space 
Flexibility and costs 
of labour 
Availability of 
transshipment 
facilities 
Access to sales 
market 
Space 
Flexibility and costs 
of labour 
Available know-how 
 
Port organization and strategy 
Organization 
characteristics 
Independent 
activities within port 
Informal relationship 
between port and 
port users 
Closer relationship 
between port and 
port users 
Loose relationship 
between activities in 
port 
Causal relationship 
between port and 
municipality 
United port 
community 
Integration of port 
with trade and 
transport chain 
Close relation 
between port and 
municipality 
Enlarged port org.  
Port network 
community 
Close relation 
between port 
network and public 
authorities on 
different levels 
Port authority’s 
task 
Nautical services (1) (1)- Development of 
grounds and 
infrastructure (2) 
(1), (2) + 
Port marketing (3) 
(1) to (3) + 
Network 
management 
Attitude & strategy Conservative 
Ports as changing 
point of transport 
Expansionist 
Transport, industrial 
and commercial 
centre 
Commercial oriented 
Integrated transport 
and logistic centre 
Commercial oriented 
Integrated transport, 
logistic and 
information complex  
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1.4 Research Objectives 
 
Given the context described above, this thesis’ main goal is to find out: 
 
a) How does the increasing transpacific container trade (with Asia) affect the 
seaport cluster in Vancouver? 
b) In what way are the local port authorities responding (to the emerging 
development pressure)? 
 
Emphasis is put on terminal improvements and strategies that the local public port 
authority adapts to confront the highly competitive environment.  
 
 
1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Thesis 
 
The research questions given in 1.4 above are quite broad. Therefore limitations in terms 
of scope and depth are necessary. Four major limitations of the research are recognized.  
 
The number of factors that influence the performance of a cluster is huge. This study only 
deals with cluster specific variables. A focus on these factors can yield new insights, as it 
has become clear that these variables have a substantial influence on the development of 
a cluster (Porter, 1990). Other variables, such as technological developments and 
(inter)national regulations clearly influence the performance of a cluster, but these are not 
incorporated in the framework.  
 
Second, no attempt is made to critically discuss other relevant schools insights that are 
required to understand the performance of seaport clusters except that of Michael Porter 
even though clusters as such have frequently been studied from many different 
perspectives. Among them, “New Economic Geography” and the “Industrial District 
School”. 
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Third, the framework to analyze the performance of clusters is only applied to seaports. 
Seaport clusters are likely to differ substantially from other clusters. Conclusions based 
on the empirical evidence can therefore not be automatically generalized to all clusters. 
 
Fourth, the study of Vancouver only gives a description of the seaport cluster at one 
moment in time. The historical background is only provided when clearly relevant. The 
performance of the cluster over time is not systematically analyzed. 
 
1.6 Project design 
 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. The following chapter, “Critical Realism”, will 
discuss views on ontology and epistemology, mainly according to a critical realist 
philosophy of science, and how these views are transformed into a method of social 
science research but also how and in what way this thesis will make use of the 
philosophy. Chapter 3 accounts for how I conducted the study and tries to give the 
grounds for some of the choices I have made. 
 
Chapter 4 and 5, on the other hand, form the theoretical underpinning that can inform and 
guide the subsequent empirical investigations. However, the ambition towards theory in 
this thesis is neither to generate new theories of cluster development or collective action 
regimes nor to verify existing ones, but to discuss the relevance of certain previously 
developed concepts and theories in order to gain knowledge that can guide and inform 
analysis.  
 
Chapter 6-8 represent the concrete part of the research, the Port of Vancouver. Though 
evolving out of the above sketched by departure, this thesis does not consider the search 
for driving forces in the Port of Vancouver’s development as an end in itself, but as a 
means to explain particular outcomes.  
 
Finally, the conclusions of the thesis are elaborated in Chapter 9.  
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Figure 1.4 below illustrates the structures of the research. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4: The structure of the research 
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2. Critical Realism 
 
 
Is it really true, there are elephants, lions too, in Piccadilly Circus? 
 
Jethro Tull 1971 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades, human geography has taken a strongly philosophical turn as 
human geographers have sought new approaches to their research. Many books have 
appeared which have become classics or milestones in the search for new ways of doing 
human geography. Among them, David Harvey’s (1973) Social Justice and the City, 
Derek Gregory’s (1978) Ideology, Science and Human Geography, Ley and Samuels’ 
(1978) edited collection on Humanistic Geography: Prospects and Problems stand out as 
early attempts to change our understanding of what human geography is and thus of the 
ways in which we do research. That is, both the questions to be asked and the ways in 
which we might try to answer them (Graham 1997).  
 
To put it differently, research involves a great number of choices and for this reason we 
need to use some kind of criteria in order to judge which the best ones to make. This is 
exactly what the philosophy of the social sciences offers; - a way of making sense of 
these complex and difficult choices. Unfortunately, it will not solve all the problems one 
will normally encounter as you prepare to engage in actual research; there is another issue 
one must consider. The philosophy of social sciences encompasses a whole series of 
competing standards and criteria that offer different ways in which the above choices can 
be understood and assessed. This diversity of rules and standards of scientific knowledge, 
claims Smith (1998), is a product of the variety of actual research in both the natural and 
the social sciences. Hence much depends on what the researcher wants to achieve. That 
is, do you want to establish objective knowledge? Do you want reliable or valid data? 
And finally, do you wish to communicate your research to a wide audience or a specific 
scientific community? The answers to these questions will have an impact upon which 
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perspective within the philosophy of social sciences most closely relates to your own 
research strategy (Smith 1998).  
 
A main share of port research is undertaken by engineers, statisticians and economics, 
working quite commonly (though more or less explicitly) in some correspondence with 
the ‘positivist’ position in the social sciences. As Askildsen (2002) notes, this means, - 
depending on the one giving the description -, that the task of the researcher is to collect 
and organize the data, whereby some sort of “pattern” will reveal itself in the form of 
universal laws. This thesis, on the other hand, aims at searching for causal factors that 
may not be empirically observable in such a direct way. For this reason, I decided to 
draws on critical realism, a distinct version of the realist philosophy, originally proposed 
by Roy Bhaskar. This is, however, neither the place to engage in a full-fledged review of 
the realist philosophy of science, nor the place to evaluate different varieties of realism or 
to resolve any philosophical debates it considers. Instead it suffices to make the claim 
that critical realism has been widely recognized as the hallmark of the Bhaskarian version 
of scientific realism in the social sciences; - a scientific philosophy that celebrates the 
existence of reality independent of human consciousness, ascribes causal powers to 
human reasons and social structures, rejects relativism in social and scientific discourses 
and re-orientates the social sciences toward its emancipatory goals.  
 
In what follows, I will very briefly introduce the canons of critical realism as a 
philosophy of science followed by a short presentation of the methodological guidelines 
for realist research.  
 
 
2.2 The Real, the Actual and the Empirical 
 
While the empirical realism treats the world as consisting of observable atomistic objects, 
events and regularities, critical realism distinguishes not only between the world and our 
experience of it, but between three domains of reality; the real or metaphorically, the 
‘deep’ (structures, mechanisms, powers and tendencies), the actual (events and states of 
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affairs) and empirical (experience and impression). When critical realists refers to the 
‘real’ this is not in order to claim privileged knowledge of it but to note two things writes 
Sayer (2000:11). First, “the real is whatever exists, be it natural or social, regardless of 
whether it is an empirical object for us, and whether we happen to have an adequate 
understanding of its nature”. Secondly, he says, “the real is the sphere of objects, their 
powers and structures” (2000:11). In other words, whether they are physical, or social, 
they have certain structures and causal powers according to critical realism, thereby 
having capacities to behave in particular ways and specific susceptibilities to certain 
kinds of change (2000). Realists therefore seek to identify both necessity and possibility. 
That is, what things must go together, and what could happen in the world given the 
nature of the objects.  
 
So, whereas the ‘real’ in this definition refers to the structures and powers of objects, the 
second domain of reality (the ‘actual’) refers to “what happens if, and when those powers 
are activated; to what they do, and what eventuates when they do” (2000:12). The 
‘empirical’ level, on the other hand, is defined as “the domain of experience”, and insofar 
as it refers successfully, it can do so with respect to either the real or the actual though it 
is contingent whether we know the real, or the actual according to Sayer. This level is 
comprised only of experiences as perceived by us. 
 
While we may be able to observe things such as the structure of an organization or a 
household, as well as what happens when they act, some structures may not be 
observable. Observability may make us more confident about what we think exists, but 
existence itself is not dependent on it (Sayer 2000:12).  
 
A crucial implication of this ontology is therefore recognition of the possibility that 
powers may exists unexercised. That is, the nature of the real objects present at a given 
time constrains and enables what can happen but does not pre-determine what will 
happen; “realist ontology […] makes it possible to understand how [...] the unemployed 
could be employed, (and) the ignorant could be knowledgeable” (Sayer 2000:12). Table 
2.1 summarizes the main elements in critical realistic ontology.  
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Table 2.1: Three different domains 
 
 Domains of Real Domains of Actual Domains of Empirical 
Mechanisms x   
Events x x  
Experiences x x x 
Source: Bhaskar, quoted in Collier (1994:4) 
 
 
Next section will move on to talk about causation, - one of the most distinctive features 
within realism.  
 
 
2.3 Causation and Causal Analysis 
 
To ask for the cause of something is normally to ask what ‘makes it happen’, what 
‘produces’, ‘generates’, ‘creates’ or ‘determines’ it, or more weakly, what enables or 
leads to it. As soon as we reflect upon such words, it becomes clear that they are 
metaphors [...] which allude to or summarize an enormous variety of means by which 
change can occur. […] And like any description they can, of course, be ‘unpacked’ and 
replaced by more detailed accounts (Sayer 1992:104). 
 
As explanations, these informal kinds of causal account as shown above are 
characteristically incomplete, but for dealing with more mundane processes they may be 
quite adequate. In order to clarify the nature and limitations of these and other types of 
causal description and explanation it is therefore necessary to proceed to a more formal 
discussion.  
 
On the realist view, causality concerns not a relationship between discrete objects events 
(‘cause’ and ‘effect’), but “causal powers or liabilities of relations and more generally, 
their ways-of-acting or mechanisms” (Sayer 1992:104);  - people have the causal powers 
of being able to work, speak, walk, and a host of causal liabilities such as susceptibility to 
group pressure. But the causal powers inhere not simply in single objects or individuals 
but in the social relations and structures which they form states Sayer and illustrates with 
a well-known example; “[…] the powers of a lecturer are not reducible to her 
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characteristics as an individual but derive from her interdependent relations with students, 
colleagues, employers, etc” (Sayer 1992:105). But powers and liabilities can exist 
whether or not they are being exercised or suffered as well (i.e. iron is liable to rust even 
though some pieces never get the chance to). On this view then, writes Sayer (1992), a 
causal claim is not about regularity between separate things or events but about what an 
object is like, what it can do and only derivatively, what it will do in any particular 
situation (see Bhaskar 1975);  
 
Hence to say that a person who happens to be unemployed nevertheless could work, 
given the opportunity, is not to indulge in speculation about what might happen in the 
future but to say something about what that person’s mental and physical state are like 
now. Causal powers and liabilities may thus be attributed to objects independently of any 
particular pattern of events; that is, not only when ‘C’ leads to ‘E’, but also sometimes 
when ‘C’ does not lead to ‘E’ (Sayer 1992:105). 
 
This means that the nature or constitution of an object and its causal powers are internally 
or necessarily related. That is, if the nature of an object changes then its causal powers 
will change too; engines lose their power as they wear out, a child’s cognitive powers 
increase as it grows. This conception of causality as a necessary way of acting of an 
object does not, as some have supposed, boil down to the virtual tautology that an object 
can do something because it has the power to do so. Yet, writes Sayer, scientists avoid 
the tautology by establishing empirically what it is about the substance which gives it this 
certain power that can be identified independently of the exercise of the power; [..] a 
well-known example is the explanation of the power of some metals to conduct 
electricity by the presence of free irons in their structure” (Sayer 1992:106). Similarly, it 
is surely not a tautology to explain my ability to walk and my ability to fly by reference 
to my anatomy, musculature, density and shape. Nor is it tautologous to explain the 
ability of certain people to live off rent by reference to their ownership of land, buildings 
or minerals.  
 
So, wherever possible, Sayer (1992) asserts we try to get beyond the recognition that 
something produces some charges to an understanding of what it is about that enables it 
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to do this. In some cases, we know little about the mechanisms involved. “What we 
would like in these latter cases is knowledge of how the processes work”, he says; 
“merely knowing that ‘C’ has generally been followed by ‘E’ is not enough. We want to 
understand the continuous process by which ‘C’ produced ‘E’, - if it did” (Sayer 
1992:107). Whether a person actually works might depend on whether there is a job for 
her him/her. Likewise, whether gunpowder ever explodes depends on its conditions 
claims Sayer. Hence, although causal powers exist necessarily by virtue of the nature of 
the objects which possess them, it is contingent whether they are ever activated or 
exercised. In the latter case, the actual effects of causal mechanisms will again depend 
upon the conditions in which they work. The relationship between causal powers and 
their effects is therefore not fixed, but contingent in which causal powers exist 
independently of their effects, unless they derive from social structures. “To say that the 
relationship of a power to its conditions is contingent is not to suppose that the latter are 
uncaused, only that they are caused by different mechanisms” (Sayer 1992:107). Causal 
powers are contingently related to their conditions; when we activate a mechanism for 
our own purposes we take care to ensure that the conditions under which it operates are 
those which will produce the desired effect.  In order to get the desired results then 
considerable care is taken to locate suitable configurations of conditions. Sayer 
exemplifies this with the explosion of a bomb (1992:108); “when it occurs, happens 
necessarily by virtue of its structure, but it might do so in a variety of conditions. The 
objects constituting the conditions have their own powers and liabilities, and so 
whichever conditions hold the results of the explosion will necessarily occur, differing 
according to whether the objects are cement, water or flesh”. 
 
As can been seen, then, the juxtaposition of necessity and contingency is complex, even 
in simple events such as this. Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between these and 
their conditions.  
 
Yet it is still up to each substantive social science to discover empirically grounded 
theories and, to set up their distinctive methodological apparatus as critical realism has 
primarily been occupied with philosophical issues and fairly abstract discussions, and less 
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Figure 2.1: The structures of causal explanation 
Source: Sæther 1999:23 
 
 
focus on how to actually carry out empirical research. The real need, then, according to 
Yeung (1997), “is to achieve a [better] dialectical mediation between philosophy 
(concerning ontology and epistemology) and the social sciences (concerning theory and 
methodology)” (1997:53). That is, most practicing realists and human geographers 
understand the crucial importance of causal powers and generative mechanisms of 
objects in explanations. But unfortunately states Yeung, precious few attempts have been 
made to reflect upon the methodological implications; - the basic methodological 
questions remain: how can things be abstracted, and how exactly should a realist conduct 
a piece of critical research (Yeung 1997:56)? Rather than providing any comprehensive 
answers to these tricky, and yet intriguing, methodological questions, I have instead 
chosen to use critical realism as an inspiration in the following and shed light on 
retroduction - one of the three methodological avenues suggested by Yeung in his article 
“Critical Realism and realist research in human geography: a method or a philosophy in 
search of a method?” - in the practice of critical realism in this master thesis3. 
 
2.4 Retroduction 
 
The retroduction strategy, - in which an argument ‘moves from a description of some 
phenomenon to a description of something which produces it or is a condition for it’ 
(Yeung 1997:59) - , has always been an important part of the process in both Sayer’s and 
                                                 
3. This is not the only method that is compatible with critical realist philosophy but may probably be the 
most practically adequate method according to Yeung (1997).  
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Bhaskar’s work to identify mechanisms (Sæther 1999). Unfortunately, neither of them 
gave any method nor answer to how retroduction should be done in practice. This section 
will therefore try to give a brief overview by focusing on how Charles Ragin’s dialogue 
of ideas and evidence is structured and how it is conducted in social sciences. That is, 
how ideas shape the understanding of evidence and how evidence affects ideas. 
 
Social research, in simplest terms, involves a dialogue between ‘ideas’ and ‘evidence’ 
claims Ragin (1994). “Ideas help social researchers make sense of evidence, to extend, 
revise and test ideas. The end result of this dialogue is a representation of social life – 
evidence that has been shaped and reshaped by ideas, presented along with the thinking 
that guided the construction of the representation” (1994:55). A major part in the 
dialogue of ideas and evidence is therefore devoted to the ‘analysis’ of the phenomena 
the researcher is studying. Analysis means breaking phenomena (facts or events) into 
their constituent parts and viewing them in relation to the whole they form. In essence, 
then, an analysis of a maritime seaport cluster involves breaking it into its key component 
parts so that it no longer appears to be an amorphous, teeming mass of stakeholders, but 
rather can be seen as a combination of key elements and conditions (Ragin 1994) that a 
researcher develops in order to aid the examination of a specific phenomenon, and, thus, 
are fundamental to social research because they constitute ways of seeing.  
 
The other part of the dialogue of ideas and evidence involves the ‘syntheses’ of evidence. 
While analysis involves breaking things into parts; synthesis involves putting pieces 
together. That is, making connections among the elements that at a first glance may seem 
unrelated. These connections may lead to further insights into the phenomenon they are 
trying to understand. The process of synthesizing evidence is therefore an important part 
of the dialogue of ideas and evidence. Ragin presents this synthesis as a process of 
forming evidence-based ‘images’ of the research subject. Figure 2.2 sketches a simple 
model of the process of social research and explains how the dialogue of ideas and 
evidence in social research is carried on through analytical frames (which articulate 
ideas) and images (evidence-based depictions of social life). 
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Figure 2.2: Shows the understanding of the process of social research 
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has introduced critical realism by sketching some of the features which 
distinguish its approach to social science. Rather than attempting to summarize the 
growing philosophical literature presenting and debating critical realism such literature, I 
have restricted myself to realism’s key features, simply indicating some of the 
philosophical arguments in its favor.  
 
The chapter began with introducing critical realism’s ontology (or theory of what exists) 
including its distinctions between the real, the actual and the empirical. The chapter then 
moved on to its distinctive view of causation and causal analysis, followed by a section 
which shed light on a scientific realist method called retroduction. Rather than being a 
strict guideline for the practice of critical realism in human geography, I have instead 
considered critical realism as an inspiration source.  
 
The next chapter will take a closer look at the thesis’ research methods and try to give the 
grounds for some of the choices been made. 
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3. Keeping on Target While Hanging Loose 
 
 
 
I’ll tell you one thing. It has been a very interesting conversion with you because I think in the 
course of conversion it’s given me the time to reflect 
 
An interviewee 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Practicing human geography is often a matter of choosing horses for courses, and the use 
of interviews is no exception to this. Interviewing has been described as ‘conversions 
with a purpose’ (Webb & Webb 1932; Burgess 1984) and, although the conversions vary 
across a range of structured, semi-structured and unstructured formats, their purpose is to 
‘to give casual explanation of production of certain objects or events’ (Sayer 1992:243), 
or as Silverman puts it; ‘to give an authentic insight into people’s experiences’ (1993:91). 
While the scientific methods so often associated with the use of questionnaires attempt 
(often unsuccessfully) to mirror the social and geographical worlds of respondents, 
interviews employ knowingly interactive research so as to gain access to the meanings 
which subjects attribute to their experiences of these worlds (Cloke et al. 2004). The 
purpose of this chapter is thus to account for how I conducted this intensive study and 
give the grounds for some of the choices I have made so far. 
 
3.2 Qualitative Interviewing - The Art of Hearing Data 
 
Qualitative research is often less structured than other kinds of social research. The investigator 
initiates a study with a certain degree of openness to the research subject and what may be 
learned from it (Ragin 1994:85) 
 
I arrived in Vancouver, in October 2005, for two months of fieldwork. The goal was to 
understand the Port of Vancouver’s behavior in light of its own history and circumstances 
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but also in the context of other considerations such as their competitive strategy, 
relationship to its markets, and the behavior of competitors (collecting the ‘evidence’ or 
‘data’ as Ragin 1994 puts it4). For this, the decision was taken to interview individuals 
who were likely to have the desired knowledge, experience and positions5 in order to 
construct a representation about the port business. That is, those considered being 
influential, prominent, and/or well-informed in the port community (more known as the 
‘elites’) and who were willing to divulge that knowledge to the interviewer. This also 
enabled me to refer to and build upon knowledge gained beforehand about the specific 
characteristics of the informants, instead of having “to affect ignorance (tabula rasa) in 
order to ensure uniformity or ‘controlled conditions’ and avoid what might be taken as 
‘observer-induced bias’” (Sayer 1992:245). But as Susan Smith (1988:22) argues: ‘any 
attempt on the part of an analyst [geographer] to enter the life world of others is above 
all, strategic…it makes both moral and analytical sense to expose the power relations 
inherent…at an early stage of the research’. 
 
A considerable number of various actors have been interviewed. Among these, 
researchers, - both those in favour and those critical to the Port of Vancouver’s future 
plans -, public officials, managers, trade analysists, customer-, and operations developers, 
transport advisors, presidents and CEO’s, business- and system developers, etc. While 
some of these informants had been contacted to answer only a few questions, other 
interviews were long in-depth semi-structured conversions (interviews based upon 
checklists to ensure coverage of the required ground), implying that ’the researcher 
introduces the topic, then guides the discussion by asking specific questions’ (Rubin & 
Rubin 1995:5). This way of proceeding gave the interviewees increased opportunity to 
participate in developing focus and scope of the project by launching thoughts and ideas 
which may have been neglected by the researcher, as would have been the situation 
where a detailed interview guide is used. In this way, the informants were able to report 
on the organizations’ policies, past histories, and future plans from a particular 
                                                 
4. The empirical world is limitless in its detail and complexity. Social research thus necessarily involves a 
selection of facts. 
5. All in all, 25 interviews were taken during the fieldwork. 23 of these were men as very few females 
worked in the maritime industry. 
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perspective which corresponds with the aim of this thesis: to explain a particular, actual 
outcome while taking contingencies into account. 
 
At the same time that elite interviews offer unique access to certain kinds of knowledge, 
the method inherently posed a number of problems during the fieldwork. First of all, it 
was often very difficult to gain access to elites because they are usually somewhat elusive 
and busy people operating under demanding time constraints. They are also often 
difficult to contact initially. A solution to this therefore was to make use of a so-called 
‘gatekeeper’ who, in my case, was a powerful figure within a particular group (Hughes & 
Cormode 1998). The gatekeeper attempted to structure my access to others, by pointing 
me towards ‘helpful’ or ‘safe’ interviewees who in the judgment of the gatekeeper were 
appropriate onward contacts. This process made me able to “snowball” further by using 
one informant to introduce another. As the term implies, this means recruiting gains 
momentum or ‘snowballs’ as the researcher builds up layers of contacts (Kvale 1997, 
Valentine 1997). The strength of this technique was that it helped me to overcome one of 
the main obstacles to recruiting interviewees, and thereby gaining their trust. It also 
allowed me to seek out more easily interviewees with particular experiences or 
backgrounds. Naturally, there are huge pitfalls inherent to the snowball-method and to 
the researcher; - ‘the researcher must retain the leeway to choose candidates for 
interview. Otherwise there is a grave danger that data collected will be misleading in 
important respects, and the researcher will be unable to engage in the strategic search for 
data that is essential to a reflexive approach’(Hammersely and Atkinson 1995:134).   
 
A second (and an obvious?) pitfall in doing elite interviews pertains to the relativist 
epistemology of critical realism. More precisely, while response to a structured interview 
of narrowly defined questions may pertain more closely to the interviewer’s perception of 
reality, semi-structured interviews, they are on the other hand, more open to a 
considerable degree for the informant’s own perceptions. Hence, “it must be kept in mind 
that just because the project gains access to key informants of adverse kinds, it does not 
mean that the researcher will gain immediate access to reality if the consequences of 
being fully honest may be a reduction in responsibility, or even program termination and 
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job loss” (Askildsen 2002:40). Informants are not “sooth-sayers” as Askildesen puts it 
and should not be considered as such. In the best case, I have been enlightened by the 
informants’ balanced conveyance of their perception of reality, in a far worse situation, 
the interviewees have turned the whole setting around and been using me as a medium to 
convey their own agenda. In those situations I have been catching lies during the 
interviews, I have therefore tried to figure out why the informant may have lied to me 
rather than being upset as lies, evasions and inconsistencies can provide useful 
information. 
 
A third disadvantage in doing elite interviews is that the interviewer often have to adapt 
the planned for structure of the interview, based on the wishes and predilections of the 
interviewed (Marshall & Rossmann 1999). Although this is true with all in-depth 
interviewing, elite individuals are typically quite savvy and may resent the restrictions of 
narrow or ill-phrased questions. This leads us to disadvantage number four, which is 
probably the most complex one in interviewed-based research if you ask me: the locus of 
control (Schoenberger 1991). The open-ended interview may afford some advantages in 
this context, although not complete immunity. Because interviews are invented anew 
each time, they can be wonderfully unpredictable. The person being interviewed may 
take control of the interview and thereby change the subject, guide the tempo, or indicate 
the interviewer was asking the wrong questions. In other words, since the likely 
informants are people accustomed to being in control and exerting authority over others, 
there is always a risk that the elites will impose his or hers own agenda on the interview 
and thereby taking charge of it and take it in directions that are not directly relevant to the 
research or worth lengthy elaboration.  
 
Not surprisingly then, perhaps, working with elites places great demands on the ability of 
the researcher who must establish competence by displaying a thorough knowledge of the 
topic being researched, while assuming a role that the elite interviewee can accept and 
trust, - a role that suggests you are knowledgeable and yet non-threatening (in order to 
discover the world of the interviewee); 
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[…] interviewers must be conscious and reflective. They must carefully watch and 
interpret the performance of the subject. Their interpretations must be based on the 
various cues, clues, and encoded messages offered by the interviewee. This extended use 
of dramaturgical metaphor perhaps overemphasizes the interview process in which 
improvisation is at least as important as delivering ‘classical’ lines (Berg 1989:35). 
 
In other words, being ethical is not only right, but useful in order to encourage 
participation. That is, letting people know what you are studying, that you want them to 
participate, that their participation is voluntary, and that, -if they want to-, their answers 
will be kept confidential. However, introducing yourself as a ‘researcher’ in a port 
community does not work as the term itself is not a meaningful category in many 
interviewees’ eyes. This point was made dramatically clear to me, when an informant I 
was researching asked, “What do you get out of this interview??” He was completely 
puzzled, as there was no role in his world for someone who was simply trying to 
understand what was happening in the organization he worked at: “It is just a port. It is 
just port business”, he said. After telling him (once again) the reason why I needed his 
help and that I had to collect information on the Port of Vancouver in order to write a 
thesis about it, he nodded his head and agreed. I had suddenly conveyed something from 
my world that he could understand6. 
 
Fortunately a variety of “interviewing strategies” could minimize, if not fully eradicate, 
the impact of some problems (Marshall & Rossmann 1999). Among these, the most 
important one was to be well-prepared in advance. By reading previous work on the 
issues being investigated (i.e. gender issues, elite interviews potential pitfalls, etc.) the 
researcher can try to avoid some of the problems that others have already encountered. 
Equally important, preparation is not the be-all and end-all of interviewing. Indeed, one 
of the key skills is a sensitivity of listening to what is being said, linked with an innate 
flexibility to permit and encourage encounters with the unexpected (Rubin & Rubin 
1995). For these reasons, the idea of the “textbook interview” can be misleading and, at 
worst, can render interviewing immune to the very inter-subjectivities which lie at the 
                                                 
6. As far as possible, I have attempted to protect my informants from harm when writing up the report. I 
have even been leaving out exciting material to keep people out of trouble. 
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heart of the process. Another strategy was to be well-informed about the chosen research 
topic as the informants are reassured to know that the investigator understands the issues 
under discussion. This hard job usually pays off in the quality of information obtained as 
the elites often contribute insight and meaning to the interview process simply because 
they are intelligent and quick thinking people. 
 
Due to the circumstances as well as the potential disadvantages in using a tape recorder, I 
chose to rely on my empathy and memory in all of my interviews. There are of course 
obvious limitations to a reliance on memory for interview analysis; no one’s memory is 
perfect (either is mine), and the longer you wait before writing up the notes, the more you 
will forget.  On the other hand, compared to audiotape recording, the interviewer’s 
immediate memory will include the visual information of the situation as well as the 
social atmosphere and the personal interaction, which to a large extent is lost in the 
audiotape recording. More interesting, if you ask me, is that active listening and 
remembering can work as a “selective filter”, and thereby retaining those very meanings 
that are essential for the topic and purpose of the study. I will now go on to discuss the 
role of participant observation and secondary data. 
 
3.3 The Role of Participant Observation and Secondary Data 
 
In addition to arrange elite interviews, I attended to The Vancouver Board of Trade 
Luncheon Conference7 which gave me extremely valuable information about the Pacific 
Gateway Strategy and some of the most important topics in the port community. This 
period of participant observation also helped me become familiar with the setting and 
vocabulary, - but more important -, to learn the port culture, that is, who gets the best and 
who gets the worst seats at a conference, who shake hands, and who chats with whom. 
What I observed is not explicitly referred to in the text, but it has acted as an important 
guidance and been pivotal in shaping my understanding of the research subject. More 
important it sharpened my understanding of the community by refining and elaborating 
                                                 
7. “Developing the Pacific Gateway Strategy”, November 24, 2005, Pan Pacific Vancouver. 
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“images” of the research subject and relating these to analytical frames. Having 
participated and seen the dynamics of the organization myself also increased my 
confidence regarding the conclusions reached. Participation can of course be 
problematized, -especially when it comes to the researcher distorting the ‘natural’ 
unfolding of events. I feel confident, however, that my presence did not alter the course 
of events as it to a large extent went unheeded. Among about 200 delegates only about 5 
knew that I was a so-called ‘outsider’. 
 
In order to get a more general picture of maritime cluster, I have in addition to arrange 
elite interviews and attended the Vancouver Board of Trade Conference used several 
‘secondary data sources8’. That is, two planning documents, several company reports, 
and several cd-rom’s. I have also paid active attention to diverse media such as the Port 
of Vancouver’s website, Canadian newspapers and even documentaries and movies 
dealing with the issue. Both the documents and the other sources became more interesting 
towards the end as I to a greater extent knew what to look for, and in addition had met 
some of the persons referred to. These secondary sources thus supplemented the data I 
collected and they were to some extent used for cross examination striving to develop 
what Yin (1994) terms converging lines of inquiry. According to Yin (1994:92) the 
conclusions reached are more convincing and accurate if “it is based on several different 
sources of information, following a corroboratory mode”. 
 
Unfortunately, I could not customize the secondary data sources to my needs. Its quality 
was sometimes unverifiable, and they were often a cultural artifact produced by 
administrators with priorities and ways of seeing the world which may be very different 
from those which underpin the thesis. Take the newspaper articles for instance. They tell 
us what is going on in the world; and they tell us about important changes taking place in 
different regions; and often presented as a “neutral” account in which facts are collected, 
analyzed and reported in an objective fashion, without bias, and in unambiguous and 
undistorted language. One should therefore seek to establish the purpose behind the 
                                                 
8. ‘Secondary data’ means information which has already been collected by someone else and which is 
available for you to inspect (Clark 1997:57). 
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production of the source rather than just accept the record as ‘somehow given’. Factual 
sources are not impartial and autonomous accounts of particular events. As a 
consequence then, I have tried to treat my documents as “social products”. That is, they 
must be examined, not simply used as a resource. ‘To treat them as a resource and not a 
topic is to…treat as a reflection or document of the world phenomena that are actually 
produced by it’ (Hammersely & Atkinson in Cloke et al. 2004:70).  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has attempted to account for how this research was conducted and hopefully 
been giving you some grounds for the reasons that have been made. However, the 
practice of human geography can never be a neutral exercise. As Cloke et al. (2000:151) 
suggest,  
 
For good or ill, the very act of entering the worlds of other people means that the research 
and the researcher become part co-constituents of those worlds. Therefore, we cannot but 
have impact on those with whom we come into contact, and indeed on those with whom 
we have not had direct contact, but who belong in the social worlds of those we have 
talked to…Ultimately such matters are entwined with the need to avoid exploitation of 
research subjects, and to give something back to them through the research process. 
These are matters of complex negotiation…  
 
The next two chapters (4-5) will form the theoretical underpinning (the ‘ideas’/ ‘social 
theory’ as Ragin calls it) in this thesis by discussing the relevance of certain previously 
developed concepts and theories and proceed it to one of its specialized forms – structural 
analysis. The analytical frames9 that guide social research are therefore carefully 
specified and debated because social researchers including me must be precise when we 
define and characterize the phenomena being studied. I will begin at the most ‘primitive’ 
level with an important but under-analyzed way of conceptualize (advancing) the ‘cluster 
concept’ and later on, ‘cluster governance’. 
                                                 
9. Analytical frames are fundamental to social research because they constitute ways of seeing. 
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4. Cluster as the Unit of Analysis 
 
 
 
 
At the outset our concepts of concrete objects are likely to be superficial or chaotic.  
 
Andrew Sayer (1992:87) 
4.1 Introduction 
 
It is impossible to initiate a qualitative study without some sense of why the subject is 
worth studying and what concepts might be used to guide the investigation. Qualitative 
research clarifies therefore concepts (the key components of analytic frames) and 
empirical categories in a reciprocal manner (Ragin 1994). 
 
In recent years there has been a growing interest in the role of location in the global 
economy. Some have argued that globalization is rendering the significance of location 
for economic activity increasingly irrelevant (Cairncross 1998, Greig 2002). Others 
espouse the opposite view, that globalization is actually increasing rather than reducing 
the importance of location, “that it is promoting greater regional economies are now the 
salient foci of wealth creation and world trade” (Martin & Sunley 2003:6). The business 
economist Michael Porter puts it in this way (Porter 1998c:90): 
 
In a global economy – which boasts rapid transportation, high speed communications and 
accessible markets – one would expect that location to diminish in importance. But the 
opposite is true. The enduring competitive advantage in a global economy are often 
heavily localised, arising from concentrations of highly specialised skills and knowledge, 
institutions, rivalry, related businesses, and sophisticated customers   
 
At the same time, it is alleged, ‘increasing global economic integration itself leads to 
heightened regional and local specialization, as falling transport costs and trade barriers 
allow firms to agglomerate with other similar firms in order to benefit from local external 
economies to scale, which in their turn are thought to raise local endogenous innovation 
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and productivity growth’ (Martin & Sunley 2003:6). For these and other related reasons, 
they argue, it has become fashionable within certain academic and policy circles to talk 
about the ‘re-emergence of regional economies’ (Sabel 1989), the ‘location of the world 
economy’ (Krugman 1997), and the rise of a ‘global mosaic of regional economies’ 
(Scott 1998).   
 
One of the most influential, - indeed, the most influential- exponent of this emphasis on 
economic location is Michael Porter, whose notion of industrial or business ‘ clusters’ has 
rapidly become the standard concept in the field. “As the celebrated architect and 
promoter of the idea, Porter himself has been consulted by policy makers the world over 
to help them identify their nation’s or region’s key business clusters or to receive his 
advice on how to promote them” (Martin & Sunley 2003:6). Although his discussion is 
framed directly in terms of the economics of ‘business strategy’, I still find the concept 
both inspiring and useful as an alleged key determinant of competitiveness even though 
the cluster idea has hardly been used to analyze seaports before.  
 
This chapter is organized in three parts. The first section will discuss the definition of 
clusters and the factors that influence cluster performance. Second, the chapter will go 
through some of the main criticism of the Michael Porter’s cluster theory provided by 
Ron Martin and Peter Sunley. Third, the chapter will try to get the semantics right and 
sketch an ‘improved’ profile of the cluster-based approach that can be used for studying a 
sea port cluster. That is, to be adequate for a specific purpose it must abstract from 
particular conditions, excluding those which have no significant effect in order to focus 
on those which do (Sayer 1992). However, while trying to be inclusive, this chapter is not 
a complete review of the existing literature in this field and does not aim to cover the new 
growth theory, or the work on industrial districts.  
      
4.2 About Clusters 
 
The idea of specialized industrial localization is hardly new. Alfred Marshall wrote 
already at the end of the nineteenth century and included a chapter in his Principles of 
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Economics (1890) on ‘concentration of specialised industries in particular localities’. His 
characterization of these local concentrations of specialized activity was cast in terms of a 
simple ‘triad’ of external economies; the ready availability of skilled labour, the growth 
of supporting and ancillary trades, and the specialization of different firms in different 
stages and branches of production.  
 
A century later, Michael Porter and a neo-Marshallian cluster theory burst the scene.  
Its origins however, can be traced to his earlier work in the late-1980s and early-1990s on 
national competitive advantage and international competitiveness (Martin & Sunley 
2003) in which he argued that the success of a nation’s export firms depends on a 
favourable national competitive diamond of four sets of factors: 
 
1. Factor conditions. The nation’s position in factors of production, such as skilled 
labour or infrastructure, necessary to compete in a given industry. 
2. Demand conditions. The nature of home demand for the industry’s product or 
service. 
3. Related and supporting industries. The presence or absence in the nation of 
supplier industries and related industries that is internationally competitive. 
4. Firm strategy, structure, and rivalry. The conditions in the nation governing how 
companies are created, organized, and managed and the nature of domestic rivalry 
(Porter 1998a:71). 
 
However, two additional variables that can influence the national system in important 
ways; ‘chance’ and ‘government’. The former is occurrences that have relatively little to 
do with circumstances in a nation and are often outside the power of firms to influence 
says Porter (1998a). A chance event, such as a demand surge, an input price shift or a 
breakthrough in basic technologies, creates a discontinuity that nullifies the advantages of 
traditional leaders and thereby provides a potential for other firms in achieving 
competitive advantage. A surge in demand for ships gave for instance Korea the 
opportunity to enter the shipbuilding industry against Japan (Porter 1998a). 
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The final element necessary to complete the picture is government which plays a 
prominent role in international competition. Some view government as a passive 
participant because the determinants of national/regional/local advantage are deeply 
rooted in its buyers, its history, and other unique circumstances. Porter, on the other hand, 
does not support this view. The government, he argues, does affect national/regional/local 
advantage, both positively and negatively, in a partial way. Government, at all levels, can 
improve or detract from the advantage. This role is seen most clearly by examining how 
policies influence each of the determinants. Investments in education can change factor 
conditions. Antitrust policy affects domestic rivalry. From Porter’s point of view (Porter 
1998a), a central goal of government policy toward the economy is, and should be, to 
deploy a nation’s resources with high and rising levels of productivity, since this is the 
root cause of a nation’s standard of living (see Figure 4.1 below). 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Government influences on cluster upgrading 
(Source:  Porter, 1998c) 
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The more developed and intense the interactions between these four sets of factors, the 
greater will be the productivity of the firms concerned (Porter 1998a). The determinants, 
individually and as a system, create the context in which a local’s firms are born and 
compete;  
 
[..] the availability of resources and skills necessary for competitive advantage in an 
industry; the information that shapes what opportunities are perceived and the directions 
in which resources and skills are deployed; the goals of the owners, managers, and 
employees that are involved in or carry out competition; and most importantly, the 
pressures on firms to invest and innovate (Porter 1998a:71).  
 
Most likely then, states Porter, countries will succeed in industries or industry segments 
where the national ‘diamond’, a term he uses to refer to the determinants as a system, is 
the most favourable. This is not to say that all a nation’s firms will achieve competitive 
advantage in an industry. In fact, several firms will fail because not all have equal skills 
and resources, nor do they exploit the national environment equally well.  
 
Later on Porter argued, and this has since become his key theme, that the intensity of 
interaction within the ‘competitive diamond’ is enhanced if the firms concerned are also 
geographically concentrated or clustered. Hence, what originally started out as a way of 
decomposing a national economy has indeed become a “spatial metaphor” of cluster-
development (see Figure 4.2). While Krugman (1997) suggested that some regions tend 
to be richer or potentially grow faster as a result of a self-reinforcing process in which 
market economies naturally concentrate economic activity in a few densely populated 
areas, Michael Porter (1990, 1998) claimed that the performance and development of 
individual businesses often appear to be determined by the external conditions in the 
proximate and local environment such as the film and media concentration in Soho, 
London, and the media concentration in Lower Manhattan, New York.  
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Figure 4.2: Porter’s competitive diamond-model’ of local industrial clustering 
Source: Porter 1998 (Ch.10) 
 
 
According to Porter, these examples are not curious isolated incidences. On the contrary, 
he says, today’s economic map of the world is dominated of clusters; critical masses of 
unusual competitive success in particular fields; 
 
A cluster is a geographically proximate group of interconnected companies and 
associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and 
complementarities (Malmberg 2003:150.Emphasizes added).  
 
There are two core elements in this definition. First, the firms in a cluster must be linked 
in some way. That is, clusters are constituted by interconnected companies and associated 
institutions linked by commonalities and complementarities. The links are both vertical 
and horizontal. Hence, “a cluster is a form of network that occurs within a geographic 
location, in which the proximity of firms and institutions ensures certain forms of 
commonality and increases the frequency and impact of interactions’ (Porter 1998a:226).  
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The second characteristic is that clusters are defined by its geographical proximity and 
externalities across industries. The crux then, is that the proximity between different 
actors makes it possible to create, acquire, accumulate and utilise knowledge a little faster 
than their cost-wise more favourable located competitors, - thus giving rise to economic 
benefits accruing from geographic concentration and the likelihood of being noticed and 
acted upon. Co-location encourages the formation of, and enhances the value-creating 
benefits arising from, networks of interaction between firms. 
  
But Porter’s cluster notion is not the only rediscovery and re-intervention of Marshall’s 
ideas to taken place in recent years. Many have devoted several considerable efforts to 
studying local industrial specialization and regional development for the past two years or 
so. So why Porter? And why has his work proved so fashionable and influential while 
that of economic geographers has not? Why have some of us started to use cluster 
terminology in preference to our own productivity and innovation? 
 
One possible reason might be the very nature of the concept itself;  
 
‘Porter’s cluster metaphor is highly generic in character, being deliberately vague (in 
term of geographical scale as well as internal socio-economic dynamics) and sufficiently 
indeterminate as to admit a very wide spectrum of industrial groupings and 
specialization, demand-supply linkages, factor conditions, institutional set ups, and so on, 
while at the same time claiming to be based on what are argued to be the fundamental 
processes of business strategy, industrial organization and economic interaction’ […] 
Rather than being a model or theory to be rigorously tested and evaluated, ‘the cluster 
idea has instead become accepted largely on faith as a valid and meaningful way of 
thinking about the national economy, as a template or procedure with which to 
decompose the economy into distinct industrial-geographic groupings for the purposes of 
understanding and promoting competitiveness and innovation’ (2003:9). 
 
A second, and related, reason could be the way in which Porter has conveyed his ideas on 
clusters. Compared to the general theoretical debates and concepts found in economic 
geography, his discussion is framed directly in terms of the economics of business 
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strategy and other useful frameworks for understanding competition that “[…] effectively 
bridge the gap between theory and practice” (Porter 1998c:2). Cluster theory, he argues, 
is “not only a tool for managers, but also a microeconomic –based approach to economic 
development for governments that is closely tied to actual competition” (1998c:7). At the 
same time, states Martin and Sunley (2003), his easy ‘business- and policy-friendly’ 
writing style, at once both accessible and commonsense, is […] “undeniably seductive, 
and is quite different from the more ‘academic’ discursive approach that characterizes 
much economic geography writing. Reinforcing this, there can be little doubt that the 
popularity of Porter’s cluster concept, compared to economic geographers’ work on 
similar notions, derives in large part from his celebrated international profile as a 
business economist”( 2003:9). 
However, seductive though the cluster concept is, there is much about it that is 
problematic - even though the cluster theory is regarded as one of the most influential 
nowadays. The next section provides thus a unique critique of the theory by Ron Martin 
and Peter Sunley (2003).  
 
4.3 A Chaotic Concept or a Policy Panacea?  
 
 ‘When I use a word’, Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose 
it to mean – neither more nor less’  
 
Lewis Carrol (1872) 
Although the definitional and conceptual elasticity of the cluster concept can be seen as a 
positive strength, in that it permits a wide range of cases and interpretations to be 
included, it can be awkward as well. That is, in order to understand their diverse 
determinations we must first abstract them systemically. When each of the abstracted 
aspects has been examined it is possible to combine the abstractions so as to form 
concepts which grasp the concreteness of their objects (Sayer 1992). In Deconstructing 
Clusters: Chaotic Concept or Policy Panacea? (2003), Martin and Sunley question not 
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only his evaluation techniques but also if the actual constructs of cluster-based economic 
development exist.  
The obvious weakness raised by Porter’s cluster definition according to Martin and 
Sunley, is first of all its lack of clear boundaries, both industrial and geographical. For 
instance, at what level of industrial aggregation should a cluster be defined, and what 
range of related or associated industries and activities should be included? How 
economically specialized does a local concentration of firms have to be to constitute a 
cluster, and at what spatial scale do they operate? There are probably very few firms that 
do not have horizontal or vertical links of some sort with other loosely-defined 
‘geographically proximate’ firms. Does this mean, Martin and Sunley ask that virtually 
every firm could be considered part of a ‘potential’ cluster? ‘[…] There is actually no 
explicit reference in Porter’s definitions that clusters are economically specialized entities 
in the Marshallian sense, yet his examples are, often very narrowly so’ (2003:10). The 
difficulty, then, is not just the boundaries of clusters, as Porter admits are ‘continuously 
evolving’. More fundamentally, the definition itself is a major source of ambiguity and 
“seems intentionally opaque and fuzzy” (2003:11). ‘The lack of precision and consensus 
has, in fact, acquired such a variety of uses, connotations and meanings that the cluster 
term has, in many respects, become a ‘chaotic concept’ of economic localization under a 
single, all-embracing universalistic notion’ (2003:9-10). The problem is that geographical 
terminology is used in a quite cavalier manner (Martin and Sunley), depending it seems, 
as Porter himself admits, on what the aim of the exercise is, or the client for whom the 
analysis is intended. So how, then, does the requirement of geographical proximity enter 
into the equation as the concept is never defined with precision in Porter’s work? To 
make matters worse, he claims that (Porter 1998a); ‘the appropriate definition of a cluster 
can differ in different locations, depending on the segments in which the member 
companies compete and the strategies they employ’.  
At one extreme, states Martin and Sunley, the term has been used to exemplify national 
groups of industries that are strongly linked, but dispersed over several different locations 
within a country, with no obvious major geographical concentrations. At the other 
extreme, ‘the term is used to refer to a local grouping of similar firms in related industries 
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within a highly spatially circumstanced area- such as the media cluster in Lower 
Manhattan’ (2003:11). In between, Porter himself refers to several regional clusters in the 
United States. This sort of ambiguous geographical definition allows an unlimited scope 
in the characterization and application of the concept, Martin and Sunley contend. ‘Just 
how far can the full complexity underpin the cluster concept as the existence appears to 
be in the eye of the beholder or should we say “creator”, and clearly, include no rules or 
guidelines involved in its use and applicability’(2003:11)? 
So where do we go from here? The search of academics to find the miracle cure to 
enhance competitiveness of industries is clearly an essential ingredient for the 
formulation of national and regional policies which stimulate the dynamics and keep the 
clusters viable. But, as we have seen, the abundant research and insights that are available 
prove, unfortunately, that it is not always easy to translate academics into real world 
policy measures. The following section will therefore discuss the theoretical 
understanding provided by Michael Porter from an economic geographic point of view 
and how this thesis makes use of it. 
 
4.4 Getting the semantics right 
 
Clustering is, as we have seen, a controversial topic which is difficult to define and 
measure with precision. It has been defined as a “geographically proximate group of 
interconnected companies and associated institutions in a particular field linked by 
commonalities and complementarities” (Porter 1998a:199), “a large group of firms in 
related industries at a particular location” (Swann & Prevezer 1998:1), as “a tendency for 
firms in similar business to locate close together though without having a particularly 
important presence in an area” (Crouch & Farwell 2001:163). Some equate clusters and 
cities, others, more specifically, suggest that the proximity inherent in a cluster extends 
up to a ‘range of fifty miles’. Being abstract then, the cluster term is also a difficult topic 
to conceptualize simply because it is a ‘chaotic concept’ (or bad abstraction) as Marx 
called it (Sayer 1992) and covers an enormous variety of activities which neither form 
structures nor interact causally to any significant degree. For this reason, a number of 
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different frameworks are offered. They share similarities and differences. Thus, being 
able to view the complex and slippery notion of clustering from different angels enables 
readers to become aware of, and to draw on, the strengths and limitations of each 
viewpoint. 
 
The cluster theory as presented by Porter truly provides a brilliant way to describe how 
various types of industrial activity are related. His model of the determinants of 
competitiveness in cluster identifies a number of mechanisms proposed to foster 
industrial dynamism, innovations and long-term growth. The point here, according to 
Malmberg (2003), which Martin and Sunley (2001) fail to acknowledge in their critique, 
is that the treatment of these factors includes several points that are indeed novel. For 
instance, the importance of local rivalry is made much more explicit than in previous 
models of spatial agglomeration. A key insight in classical agglomeration theory is of 
course that a firm may gain advantages from being close to each other. Rarely, though, 
has this advantage been attributed to the fact that spatial proximity between rivals will 
trigger dynamism and growth; “[…] the idea is that local rivalry adds intensity and an 
emotional dimension to competition that most firms perceive in the global market. The 
firm down the road is often seen as the ‘prime enemy’, a bit like the rivalry between 
neighbouring football clubs” (Malmberg 2003:149). Partly because direct comparison is 
simplified, and partly for reasons of rivalry, firms in a local milieu tend to develop 
relations of rivalry where benchmarking in relation to the neighbours is more direct.  
Second, the treatment of the diamond side as a primarily qualitative factor is original. 
Porter’s account, in contrast to previous models which emphasize access to a large 
market as an important location advantage, he alerts us that it is the sophistication of 
demand that matters. That is, if you are interested in long-term competitiveness and 
innovation (Malmberg 2003). 
 
At the same time, it is easy to agree that there is a good deal of conceptual fuzziness 
surrounding the cluster issue, such as Martin and Sunley (2001) do in the previous 
section. There are now so many different varieties of clusters and so many confusing 
claims about their theoretical basis, form, identification and significance that the concept 
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is peculiarly elusive and hard to pin down (Malmberg 2002). The feeling that there must 
be ‘more to it than this’ is endemic. With a concept as elastic, it has turned out to be 
extremely difficult to identify empirically the mechanisms that are supposed to account 
for its existence. “At present the siren of universalism is pulling the cluster concept into 
shallow waters. It is being applied so widely that its explanation of causality and 
determination becomes overly stretched, thin and fractured (Martin & Sunley 2003:146). 
Unfortunately, one might say that Porter himself has contributed to the conceptual ‘mess’ 
by presenting different basic definitions in various texts since the 1990s (Malmberg 
2003). Therefore, to be meaningful and useful, typologies need to be precise and clear. It 
is far from clear at what geographical range, and over what geographical range the term 
‘cluster’ operates. And what does Porter actually mean by ‘cluster’ and ‘clustering’? Are 
they functional or spatial phenomena? That is, there are many situations both in everyday 
life and scientific practice where such concepts can be used unproblematically as simple 
categories for descriptive purposes. But a term like ‘cluster’ creates problems as soon as 
anyone attributes unitary causal powers or liabilities to the objects falling in that class. 
Although Porter has given a brilliant description of the mechanisms enhancing 
productivity and the complex interplay between the factors in the diamond, he never 
formulated a theory of location. Even though it is obvious that strong clusters will attract 
companies, particular the most knowledge intensive, there is not a one-to-one relationship 
between growth in productivity and location attractiveness.  
 
Yet, taken together, it seems to me that clustering is important enough to justify an 
attempt to track its conceptual underpinnings and empirical status (even if it means that 
different and perhaps not always compatible accounts are lumped together in an eclectic 
way into something defined as ‘clustering research’). Although the main criticism of the 
idea cluster is that it lacks precision, this is not, of course, a problem confined to the 
‘cluster’ term, but also to other concepts such as locality and region; [..] ‘Porter’s view of 
the sources and nature of technological development, his short prayer to localized 
processes and the gradual ‘networking of the clusters’ lay the grounds for the spatial 
operationalization of the ‘regional cluster’ as the most practice oriented, but also one of 
the most market logic led version of the territorial innovation model (Moulaert & Sekia 
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2003:293). Michael Porter has in fact given some genuine contributions to economic 
geography from my point of view, and there are several reasons to take the issue of 
clusters seriously, despite its lack of precision and clarity. One is that spatial clustering is 
at the very hard core of what research in economic geography is actually all about. 
Analysis of spatial clustering brings to the fore concepts such as proximity, place and 
milieu – all focal points for research in economic geography. There is a lot to learn about 
the role of proximity and place in economic processes by trying to pinpoint the driving 
forces that make for the agglomeration in space of similar and related economic 
activities. Second, this task has obviously policy relevance today. Porter’s theoretical 
basis of business clusters has turned out to be an essential ingredient for the formulation 
of industrial and regional policy throughout the world. As an important element of these 
policies we find a doctrine saying that regions should specialize and promote the 
dynamics of spatial clustering in order to gain or sustain competitiveness and prosperity 
(Malmberg & Maskell 2002). 
 
But in an attempt to get the semantics right, it would be practical if one could collectively 
strive to establish a cluster-terminology that is free as possible from basic confusion (a 
more ‘careful conceptualization’ which no one would refuse as Sayer would had put it). It 
is indeed “deeply unsatisfactory to develop a scholarly conversation around a core 
concept – the cluster – the meaning of which various participants in the conversation has 
different opinions, not in detail but at the level of basic definition” (Malmberg 2003:151). 
There is nothing inherent in the concept itself to indicate its spatial range or limits, or 
whether and in what ways different clustering processes operate at different geographical 
scales. Although the definitional and conceptual elasticity of the cluster concept can be 
seen as a positive strength, in that it permits a wide range of a cases and interpretations to 
be included this problem, as Porter himself admits, means that “the geographical 
terminology can be used on what the aim of the exercise is, or the client for whom the 
analysis is intended” (Martin & Sunley 2003:12). I am not suggesting that the concept 
should refer to a particular pre-specified geographical size or scale; but using the term to 
refer to any spatial scale is stretching the concept to the limits of credulity. That is, if the 
same externalities and networks that typify clusters do indeed operate at a whole variety 
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of spatial scales, this surely weakens the empirical and analytical significance of the 
cluster concept (Martin & Sunley 2003). On the suggestion of Malmberg, then, it might 
be useful to employ a related term such as ‘industry cluster’ instead since the ‘c-word’ is 
presumably going to be around for a while. Alternatively, he persists, when we face 
geographical concentrations of similar or related economic activity, one could preferably 
use the traditional term ‘agglomeration’, or possibly ‘spatial (or localized) cluster’ in 
order to avoid some of the confusion. An approach like this, take point of departure in 
territorial defined system elaborate more carefully the spatial aspects of the system, even 
if they are sometimes suspiciously vague about defining the system’s particular territorial 
scale (Malmberg 2003:151).  
 
4.4.1 The Seaport Cluster 
 
Even though the cluster concept has hardly been used to analyze seaports before (see 
1.3), this thesis draws upon a modified Porterian version (see Hazendonck 2001) in 
which the emphasis is on the entire set of organizations that contribute directly to the Port 
of Vancouver’s performance in terms of relative growth rate and market share. In this 
context, a port can be considered as an interrelated collection of activities performed by 
various actors connected through these activities. Hence, building upon earlier definitions 
by Porter (1990, 1998) and Krugman (1991), an adequate understanding of a port cluster 
is thus defined as a “set of interdependent firms engaged in port related activities, located 
within the same port region and possibly with similar strategies leading to competitive 
advantage and characterized by a joint competitive position vis-à-vis the environment 
external to the cluster” (Hazendonck 2001:136). It should be noted that, especially in the 
regional economics literature, ports are usually studied as elements fully dependent on 
the larger system within which they operate; typically an intercontinental, origin-
destination logistics chain. The focus in this study, however, is not the entire logistics 
system, but precisely the port cluster as a critical hub and key component in that logistics 
chain.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the clarifying definition of clusters and the factors that 
influence cluster performance.  I have also gone through some of the main criticism of 
the Michael Porter’s cluster theory provided by Ron Martin and Peter Sunley where they 
questioned not only his evaluation techniques but also if the actual constructs of cluster-
based economic development exist. The last part attempted to get the semantics right in 
order to sketch an ‘improved’ profile of the cluster approach (a rational abstraction).  
 
Next chapter will introduce the concept of ‘cluster governance’, - another useful and 
relevant concept I will attempt to clarify and advance.  
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5. Cluster Governance 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The analysis of seaport governance has for a long time been limited to the role of the port 
authority (Goss 1990, Stevens 1999) and the appropriate mix of public and private 
investments (see the port reform toolkit of the World Bank 2002). However, 
notwithstanding the important roles of port authorities, to limit an analysis of cluster 
governance to an analysis of the port authority as Stevens (1999) does in “The 
Institutional Position of Sea Ports” might be very shortsighted since it neglects other 
important actors in the port communities such as the central government and private port 
operators (i.e. stevedoring firms, cargo handling companies, and terminal operators). In 
addition to their important role in providing funds for infrastructure development and 
superstructure, private port operators often acts as a service provider. This has not only a 
profound impact on management structures and services provided, but also on long-term 
public participation in port development. Drewry Shipping Consultants puts it like this 
(Drewry Shipping Consultants 1998:6): 
 
The modern port can be described as a community of independent enterprises tied 
together by a common interest in maritime affairs. Central to this community is an entity 
known as the port authority, always a regulator, usually a landowner, often a developer 
and sometimes a terminal operator’ (emphasis added) 
 
This chapter will therefore give a theoretical discussion of cluster governance10, based on 
the work by Peter de Langen (2004a, b), and its influence on the performance of seaport 
clusters. Different coordination mechanisms will be used, - market coordination included. 
Issues as ‘hold-up’ and ‘hostages’ (Nooteboom 1999) are not discussed.  
                                                 
10. I have chosen to define cluster governance as the coordination of activities in a cluster. Jessop (1997: 
95) defines governance as ‘collaborative interaction between stakeholders’. In that sense, my definition is 
more ‘Williamsonian’: that is, starting from an analysis of the roles of different mechanisms of 
‘collaborative interaction’. 
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A framework to analyze coordination in a cluster is developed in the first paragraph 
followed by a discussion on cluster governance. A concluding section finalizes the 
chapter. 
 
5.2  Coordination in a cluster 
 
The need for coordination in clusters is undisputed amongst cluster scholars (Harrison 
1994). De Langen (2004ba:54) puts it in this way: 
 
Cluster scholars frequently regard clusters as special solutions to a coordination problem. 
In this stream of literature (the flexible specialization literature, see Piore & Sabel 1984) 
clusters are regarded as networks of (small) firms in which cooperation is based solely on 
trust […] Other scholars as Markusen (1996) question this particular definition but 
acknowledge the importance of coordination in a cluster.   
 
Different modes of coordination, or to use the terminology of Williamson: modes of 
governance can play a role in clusters states de Langen (see Hollingsworth et al. 1994). 
He distinguishes therefore six general modes of coordination (see Campbell et al. 1991, 
Hollingsworth & Boyer11 1997, and Williamson 1985): markets, firms, interfirm 
alliances, associations, public-private organizations and public organizations12. None of 
the different modes of coordination is ‘structurally superior’ states de Langen (2004a) as 
“each mode has advantages and disadvantages” (2004a:54). As a consequence, “[…] 
different modes of coordination are used in a specific domain13, to solve different 
                                                 
11. Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997) identify six modes of governance, five of which (firms, markets, 
interfirm alliances, associations and public organizations) are included in this study. Public private 
organizations are added and ‘communities’ are omitted, because communities are not designed to 
coordinate specific activities. 
12. Campbell et al (1991) argue that government has such special abilities (such as changing property 
rights, allocating resources and serving as gatekeepers) that it cannot be analyzed as merely an alternative 
governance mechanism. Hollingsworth and Lindberg (1985) and Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997) do 
analyze the state as a governance mechanism. Peter de Langen (2004a) includes public organizations in the 
analysis of governance when they provide public services (such as education). The legislative role of the 
government is not included in the analysis. 
13. This is a ‘Williamsonian approach’, because each mode of governance has a ‘structural domain’, based 
on its advantages and disadvantages. However, this does not imply that all modes of governance develop 
automatically in their ‘structural domain’. Thus, this framework is not sufficient to analyze governance 
regimes in full detail, but a useful starting point. 
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coordination problems” (2004a:54). In Table 5.1, an overview is given of different modes 
of governance, their advantages, disadvantages and ‘domain’. The table below also shows 
under what conditions the coordination modes adapt (or are adapted) and whether or not 
the six governance modes are capable of solving a collective action problem (this issue is 
discussed in more detail later) according to de Langen (2004a:55).  
 
 
Table 5.1: Characteristics of modes of governance 
 
Governance 
modes 
Advantages Disadvantages Domain Capable of 
solving 
collective 
action 
problem 
Mechanisms of pressure 
Firms Smooth 
coordination 
Limited set of 
capabilities, 
limited 
flexibility 
Coordination of 
strongly related 
economic 
activities 
Not suitable Market competition 
Shareholders/ 
Stakeholders 
Market Flexibility 
and selection 
pressure 
Coordination 
beyond price is 
difficult 
Exchange of 
alternatively 
available 
products 
Not suitable Market competition 
(exit) 
Inter-firm 
alliances 
Relatively 
effective 
coordination 
Reduced 
flexibility 
Coordination of 
complementary 
activities that 
require 
different 
capabilities 
Only 
suitable for 
small 
groups of 
firms 
Market competition 
Association Pursuing 
collective 
goals 
Free rider 
behavior 
Pursuing 
collective goals 
Suitable, but 
problem of 
incentives 
Voice of members 
Public/private 
organization 
Combination 
of public and 
private 
competencies 
Limited 
selection 
pressure, 
limited 
accountability 
Projects in the 
public interests 
that require 
private 
involvement 
Suitable, but 
risk of 
opportunism 
Private and public voice 
Public 
organization 
Capable of 
acting in the 
‘public 
interest’ 
No clear 
incentives, no 
selection 
pressure 
Pursuing public 
interests 
Suitable, but 
information 
problems 
and lack of 
incentives 
Public monitoring 
 
Source: de Langen (2004a:55) 
 
Various case studies of clusters (such as Mistri 1999) suggest that the quality of 
governance in a cluster14 can differ between clusters. But unfortunately, no satisfactory 
framework to analyze the quality of coordination in a cluster has been proposed. 
According to de Langen two factors determine the quality of governance: i) the level of 
                                                 
14. Quality so defined that a higher quality leads to a better performance of the cluster. 
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coordination costs (the transaction cost)15, and ii) the ‘scope’ of ‘coordination beyond 
price’ (i.e. setting of standards, investing in the labor pool, cooperation in innovation 
projects and information sharing). See Figure 5.1. below for more information. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: The quality of coordination in a cluster 
Source: Peter de Langen 2004a:56 
 
But coordination beyond price16 does not develop ‘spontaneously’ even when the overall 
benefits of coordination are higher than the overall costs. One possible reason according 
to Olson (1971) might be that an unequal distribution of benefits can prevent 
coordination. That is, if one or a few firms are worse off they will obstruct efforts to 
increase the scope of coordination. Another reason he says, is that opportunistic behavior, 
such as ‘free riders’, can obstruct coordination. Finally, “uncertain benefits prevent 
coordination as firms are risk-averse when confronted with uncertainty” (de Langen 
2004a:57). 
                                                 
15. These costs include the costs of searching for partners, the costs of specifying contracts, the costs of 
‘monitoring’ performance, and the ‘pure’ interaction costs such as time and travel expenses. 
16. In this section coordination is used for coordination beyond price. 
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In what follows (5.3 and 5.4), two variables that both enlarge the scope of coordination 
beyond price and reduce the level of coordination costs will be introduced. That is, leader 
firms and collective action as these two are considered as the most important and relevant 
ones for the thesis.  
 
5.3  Leader firms 
 
Leader firms are according to de Langen (2003) firms with a relatively large impact on 
other companies in the cluster and the cluster as a whole. Lorenzoni and Badenfuller 
(1995:147) define leader firms as ‘strategic centers with superior co-ordination skills and 
the ability to steer change’. Lazerson and Lorenzoni (1999:362), on the other hand, 
identify ‘focal firms’ defined as ‘companies that occupy strategically central positions 
because of the greater number and intensity of relationships that they have with both 
customers and suppliers’. The most prominent outcome of this position is the role these 
focal firms play in innovation claims de Langen (2003:6) in which “leader firms can act 
as lead users […] that triggers innovation processed with suppliers”.  
 
In the above- mentioned studies on leader firms, their effects on the cluster as a whole are 
recognized, but the effects of leader firms on other firms in the cluster are not analyzed. 
Albino et al. (1999) stress therefore the importance of a leader firm for the development 
of other firms in the cluster in which leader firms can be enablers for the 
internationalization of other firms in the clusters. On the basis of ‘many cases’, they 
argue that ‘leader firm internationalization can be considered the main impulse for district 
internationalization’ (Albino et al. 1999:57). In this sense, leader firms act as ‘launching 
customers’ for the internationalization of their suppliers or sell products from the cluster 
in foreign markets. Other scholars have also recognized that the development of small 
firms depends to some extent on the presence and behavior of a larger firm with strong 
co-ordination skills (de Langen 2003). 
 
In other words, leader firm investments encourage to innovation, enable 
internationalization of other firms in the cluster and improve the quality of the labour 
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pool. In these ways, leader firms contribute to the competitiveness of other firms in the 
cluster and, as a consequence, the cluster as a whole. Peter de Langen defines therefore 
leader firms as follows (2003:7): 
 
Leader firms are firms that have - due to their size, market position, knowledge and 
entrepreneurial skills - the ability and incentive to make investments with positive 
externalities for other firms in the cluster (Emphasis added). 
 
Investments of (leader) firms with substantial network externalities include investments 
in innovation and internationalization. The benefits of both innovation and 
internationalization spread to all ‘members’ of the network. Three investments with 
substantial cluster externalities are identified: investments in training and education, 
knowledge and information infrastructure, and finally an infrastructure for collective 
action. These investments improve the competitiveness of the cluster. Figure 5.2 
illustrates these effects and the resulting positive effect of leader firm behavior on the 
competitiveness of clusters. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Network and cluster externalities of leader firm investments 
Source: Peter de Langen (2003:8) 
 
 
The positive external effects can simply be ‘side effects’ of investments of large firms 
that are not relevant for the investment decision of these large firms. Especially large 
firms make investments with substantial ‘incidental’ positive externalities claims de 
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Langen (2003). But creating externalities can also be a part of a strategy of large firms. In 
this case he says, “[…] leader firms can take the externalities into account in their 
decision process. Leader firms can have such a strong market position that a large part of 
the benefits of a more competitive network/cluster end up ‘in their pockets’” (2003:8).  
 
Leader firms can also have an incentive to make investments with shared benefits, but not 
a sufficient incentive to invest by themselves (de Langen 2003). Such investment 
projects, provided that shared benefits exceed shared costs, face a ‘collective action 
problem’ (Olson 1971). For such investments, a financial arrangement to share costs is 
necessary. Given their position as prime beneficiary, leader firms have the incentive to 
play a leading role in devising such arrangements. The next paragraph will take a closer 
look at collective action regimes. 
 
 
 
5.4 Collective action regimes 
 
5.4.1 The Problem of Collective Action 
 
“The ‘problem’ of collective action involves almost every aspect of an advanced 
economy but more important it is relevant for all clusters” (de Langen 2004a:61). Even 
the formation of a firm and its operation in an oligopolistic industry can be viewed as a 
collective action problem (Sandler 1992). To put it differently, even though cooperation 
to achieve common goals (such as marketing and education) would be beneficial for all 
organizations involved in a cluster, such cooperation does not always develop 
spontaneously since individual firms can ’free ride’17 on the cooperative efforts of other 
firms. That is, if members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their personal 
welfare, they will not act to advance their common or group objectivities unless there is 
coercion to force them to do so, or unless some separate incentive, distinct from the 
achievement of the common or group interests is offered to the members of the group 
                                                 
17. In a broad sense, a free rider is anyone who contributes less than his or hers true marginal value derived 
from a non-excludable public good. In doing so, they save income that could have been used to buy other 
excludable goods (Sandler 1992). 
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individually on the condition that they help bear the costs or burdens involved in the 
achievement of the group objectives (Olson 1971). Thus, collective action does not arise. 
In other words, “collective action regimes” (CAR)18 is not by definition an ‘efficient’ 
system and do not easily adapt states de Langen (2004a:61): 
 
Inefficient collective action regimes reduce the performance of a cluster, but there is no 
process of ‘selection and adaptation’ that leads to the survival of effective regimes only. 
A regime is path dependent and relatively stable over time, because […]energy and 
capital have been invested in a regime and these investments are ‘sunk costs’ that prevent 
adaptations of a regime and second, a regime defines the ‘rules of the game’ and becomes 
taken for granted. 
 
As a result then, collective action regimes differ substantially between countries, 
industries and clusters (de Langen 2004a).  
 
 
5.4.2 The Roles of Modes of Governance in Collective Action 
Regimes 
 
Collective action arises when a large number of firms in a cluster cooperate to further the 
interests or well-being of its members states Sandler (1992). Associations, public private 
partnerships and public organizations are therefore governance modes better equipped to 
solve collective action problems (2004a:62)’ than markets, individual firms and inter-
firm alliances. To illustrate this phenomenon, I have chosen to rely on Olson’s work on 
collective action regimes in “The Logic of Collective Action” from 1971.  
 
Olson (1971) distinguishes three kinds of groups: ‘privileged’, ‘mediate’ and ‘latent’ 
groups. ‘The small privileged group’, he says; ‘can expect that its collective needs will 
probably be met one way or another, and the fairly small (intermediate) group has a fair 
chance that voluntary action will solve its collective problems, but the large latent group 
                                                 
18. In this context, a regime can be defined as a relatively stable collaborative agreement that provides 
actors with the capacity to overcome collective problems (see Mossberger & Stoker 2001 for a similar 
definition). 
 55 
cannot act in accordance with its collective interests so long as members of the group are 
free to further their individual interests’ (Olson 1971:58). 
 
The “intermediate” group, however, is a group in which no single member gets a share of 
the benefit sufficient to give it an incentive to provide the good itself, but which does not 
have so many members that no one member will notice whether any other member is or 
is not helping to provide the collective good states Olson (1971:50). In such a group a 
collective good may, or equally may not, be obtained, but no collective good may ever be 
obtained without some group co-ordination or organization. The analog to atomistic 
competition is the very large group, the ‘latent group’. It is distinguished by the fact that, 
if one member does or does not help provide the collective good, no other member will 
be significantly affected and therefore none has any reason to react. Thus, an individual 
in a ‘latent’ group, by definition, cannot make a noticeable contribution to any group 
effort, and since no one in the group will react if some makes no contribution, they have 
no incentive to contribute according to Olson. For that reason, ‘large or latent groups 
have no incentive to act to obtain a collective good (i.e. cluster marketing) because, 
however valuable the collective good might be to the group as a whole, it does not offer 
the individual any incentive to pay dues to any organization working in the latent group’s 
interest, or to bear in any other way any of the costs of the costs of the necessary 
collective action’ (1971:51). Only a separate and selective incentive or a ‘sense of 
community’- argument (see Bennet 1998) will therefore stimulate a rational individual in 
a latent group (i.e. an organization) to act in a group-orientated way. In a public private 
organization (i.e. the Port of Vancouver), however, activities are said to be best pursued 
jointly when both public and private interests are represented in an organization and both 
sides are willing to contribute financially to the activities of public private bodies. 
Examples of this include knowledge - and education projects. However, since public 
private bodies have relatively high set-up costs and uncertain pay-offs (see de Langen 
2004a), they can only be developed when governments provide substantial support.  
 
The domain of public organization on the other hand, is often limited to those activities 
where private initiative is not likely to yield socially desirable outcomes and regulations 
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also do not lead to socially desirable outcomes. That is, activities such as safety and 
planning are generally regarded as inside the ‘public domain’ (de Langen 2004a). Figure 
5.3 summarizes an overview of modes of governance and their role in a collective action 
regime. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: The role of various coordination mechanisms in a regime  
Source: Peter de Langen 2004b:65 
 
 
5.4.3  The Quality of a Collective Action Regime 
Five cluster specific variables that influence the quality of a collective action regime can 
be identified (see de Langen 2004a for a detailed discussion). Various actors have to 
contribute resources to the regimes. These resources can be financial and managerial, but 
also ‘political’ and relational. The more resources are invested in a regime, the higher the 
quality of such a regime. A first variable relevant to the quality of regimes is the presence 
of leader firms. Such firms have incentives and resources to invest in improving various 
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regimes, and can play a leading role in the development of coalitions. Therefore, they are 
important for increasing the quality of a collective action regime (Olson 1971). 
Second, the participation and activities of public organizations influence the quality of a 
regime. Public organizations frequently contribute financially to collective action regimes 
(Porter 1990). Third, the presence of an organizational infrastructure for collective action, 
which enables cooperation and thus serves as a means of gathering the required 
resources, is relevant. The infrastructure for collective action consists of associations, 
public–private organizations, and the internal network structure of clusters. These do not 
develop automatically; as various types of trust are required (Nooteboom 2002) to reduce 
the transaction costs of co-operation, and to overcome static arguments against getting 
involved in any type of co-ordination beyond market price transactions between firms. 
Once developed, organizational infrastructure for collective action provides a basis for 
creating and developing effective regimes. 
The fourth variable adding to the quality of a regime is the presence of a community 
argument. A stronger willingness of the ‘port community' to develop effective regimes 
leads to better coalitions. Finally, the voice of individual firms contributes to the quality 
of a regime. The voice of private firms increases the pressure on associations, public and 
public–private organizations (that face no ‘market selection pressure') to be effective. 
This pressure enhances the performance of these organizations. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has been discussing two variables of cluster governance based on Peter W. 
de Langen’s work on seaport clusters: “leader firms” and “collective action”. To sum up:  
 
• Leader firms generate positive external effects for firms in their network, mainly 
by encouraging innovation and promoting internationalization. 
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• Leader firms generate positive external effects for firms in the cluster, mainly by 
organizing investments in the training and education infrastructure, the innovation 
infrastructure and the infrastructure for collective action. 
• The more resources are invested in collective action regimes, the better the 
performance of a cluster. Five variables influence the amount of invested 
resources: the role of leader firms, the role of public organizations, the presence 
of an infrastructure for collective action, the presence of a community argument 
and finally, the use of voice. 
  
Equally important is that this chapter represents an important crossroad. That is, while 
Chapter 1-5 developed theoretical categories to better understand the necessary internal 
relations that form the structures by establishing conceptual boundaries around the 
evidence-based image (the analytical frame), the following chapters (Chapter 6-8) will 
attempt to give an account of different events and their consequences more known as the 
‘concrete’ part of the research process, -partly the result of actions done by individual 
actors and partly the result of structural conditions. That is, while abstract theory 
analyzed objects in terms of their constitutive structures as part of wider structures and in 
terms of their causal powers, concrete research on the other hand, aims to look at what 
happens when these combine. It is important to understand that in social research, the 
dialogue of ideas and evidences (social representation) appear to audiences as finished 
products, complete with images and frames. However, the finished product results from a 
long process. That is, there is an interplay of possible frames and potential images in the 
construction of every representation.   
 
Next chapter (Ch. 6) will attempt to give the reader an overview of the Vancouver port 
business before presenting the main analysis in Ch. 7-8.   
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6. The Port of Vancouver: An overview 
 
 
 
        West End, Vancouver 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Like the economies of other areas around the world, the province of British Columbia 
(see map below), is in a period of transition - marked by changing industrial structures 
and greater integration with the international economy. At the same time, as global 
economic integration has intensified, international trade has become more important for 
meeting the demands of British Columbia’s (B.C.) businesses and consumers, as well as 
for providing markets for goods produced in B.C. (Greater Vancouver Gateway Council 
2003). 
 
 
Figure 6.1: The Province of British Columbia 
Source: Wikipedia 
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Finally, as economic globalization extends to countries previously on the periphery of the 
international economy - most strikingly the developing and emerging economies in Asia - 
there has been a change in the composition of economic trading partners for firms in B.C. 
and other parts of Canada. Long being a key gateway between the Asian and North 
American economies, and a critical node in the transportation complex that integrates the 
North American economies, B.C. is particularly affected by the globalization of 
economic activity. The growing importance of Asia as a global production site and North 
American trading partner has generated greater and more challenging demands on the 
transportation structures that integrate the Asian and North American economies. The 
gateway function historically served by B.C. has become even more important for growth 
and stability of the North American economies, as well as for the economic health of the 
province itself.  
 
The gateway function played by British Columbia is evident in two ways. The first, 
illustrated in Figure 6.2 shows the scale of trade and cargo movement from Asia to the 
B.C. economy. While trade with Asia accounts for less than 10% of all Canadian trade, it 
accounts for approximately 35% of British Columbia’s trade, 55% of cargo movements 
through the Port of Vancouver, and 95% of container movements through the port 
(Greater Vancouver Gateway Council 2003). 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Asian Percentage of Total Trade by Dollar Value, 200219 
                                                 
19. Source: Comprised from Statistics Canada, International Trade Data, and Vancouver ports. Note: 
Shipments to Asia also occur from other ports in the region, although they did not have destination 
statistics available on a comparable basis for this graph. 
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The second key indicator of B.C.’s role as a gateway between the Canadian and Asian 
economies is the high number of Asian imports for the entire Canadian economy handled 
in B.C. This is illustrated in Figure 6.3, which shows the proportion of Asian imports 
coming through BC. From 1995, when just over 20% of the dollar value of all imports 
from Asia cleared Canadian customs through B.C., this number had raised to a total of 
more than 30 % by 2002 (Greater Vancouver Gateway Council 2003). Most of the 
remainder of Asian imports comes into Canada through the US or directly to international 
airports throughout Canada. 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Portion of Total Value of All Canadian Imports Entering through British Columbia, 
Growth 1993-200320 
 
Source: Greater Vancouver Gateway Council 2003 
 
These trends will be magnified in the coming years, as developing and emerging 
economies in Asia become more central to global production and trade. Although the 
proportion of B.C. total exports destined for Asia fell during the 1990s when Japan’s 
economic problems slowed its consumption of imports, the decade saw the rise of two 
new important Asian trading partners -China and Korea-, which emerged as the third and 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
20. This graph shows BC’s share of Canadian imports in terms of dollar value; it is important to note that 
BC’s share by weight are much higher. Source: Statistics Canada (International TradeData) and Vancouver 
ports. 
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fourth largest destinations for B.C.’s exports. Given the favorable long-term growth 
prospects for these and other Asian economies, North American trade with Asia is likely 
to grow for the foreseeable future, a situation that B.C. is highly situated to exploit 
according to the Vancouver Gateway Council. This puts B.C. in an unusual and enviable 
position. Contrary to other local economies around the world which struggle to find their 
niche in the global economy, British Columbia can capitalize on and expand its existing 
role as a logistical and cultural link between North America and Asia. The ability of B.C. 
to create transportation and economic structures to keep pace with these changes will 
therefore have a profound effect on the long-term economic health and employment 
structures within the province.  The challenges however as you will see are immense 
since China’s economic growth has been nothing short of incredible and it is expected to 
continue.  
 
This chapter will try to give the reader a brief introduction to the Port of Vancouver. It 
starts with placing the Port geographically, followed by a paragraph describing its role as 
a job generator before presenting Vancouver’s maritime cargo industry. Finally, a short 
recapitulation will demonstrate whether or not the Port of Vancouver is a seaport cluster 
by introducing some of its stakeholders.  
 
6.2 The Port of Vancouver 
 
 
Burrard Inlet21 differs from most of the great sounds of this coast in being extremely easy to 
access to vessels of any size or class, and in the convenient depth of water for anchorage which 
may be found in almost any part of it; its close proximity to Fraser River, with the great facilities 
for constructing roads between the two laces, likewise adds considerably to its importance 
 
Captain George Richards 1864 (in Armitage 2001) 
 
                                                 
21. Burrard Inlet is a relatively shallow-sided coastal fjord in southwestern British Columbia named by 
Captain George Vancouver in June 1792, after his friend Sir Harry Burrard. The inlet runs almost directly 
east from the Strait of Georgia to Port Moody and is urbanized on most of its shores (Armitage 2001). 
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Vancouver’s prime geographic location on the southwest coast of British Columbia 
positions the Port of Vancouver22 as North America’s gateway. The Port is a safe, year-
round, all-weather; naturally deep harbour with 233 km of coastline extending from Point 
Roberts at the Canada/U.S. border through Burrard Inlet to Port Moody and Indian Arm 
and includes 25 major marine cargo terminals which collectively offer 57 berths, post-
Panamax capacity and on-dock rail facilities (Economic Impact Update 2005). In the map 
below three of its newly expanded and ISPS compliant container terminals are shown: 
Centerm, Vanterm (located in Burrard Inlet), and Deltaport at Roberts Bank (35 km from 
Vancouver’s city centre). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: The Port of Vancouver’s three container terminals  
Source: Author’s own work 
 
                                                 
22. The Port of Vancouver is managed by the Vancouver Port Authority (VPA) established on March 1, 
1999 by the Canada Marine Act as the successor organization to the Vancouver Port Corporation. 
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6.3 The Port of Vancouver as a Job Generator 
 
The Port of Vancouver is a major generator of jobs in Greater Vancouver, Western 
Canada and across Canada. An estimated 30,100 direct jobs are generated by Port of 
Vancouver activities, equivalent to almost 26,500 direct person years of employment23. 
As can be seen in Table 6.1, the largest of these sectors is maritime cargo which 
generates over 21,000 direct jobs (19,800 direct person years). The second largest sector 
is cruise which generates close to 5,600 direct jobs (3,850 person years). When multiplier 
effects are considered (indirect and induced impacts), the total employment impact of the 
Port of Vancouver across all five sectors is 69,200 jobs or 60,600 person years of 
employment (InterVISTAS Consulting 2005). 
 
Table 6.1: Jobs in the Port of Vancouver’s Five Employment Sectors 
 
Source: InterVISTAS Consulting 2005 
 
6.4 Maritime Cargo Traffic Volumes through the Port of 
Vancouver 
 
The total volume of maritime cargo shipped through the Port of Vancouver in 2004 was 
73.6 million tonnes, as shown in Figure 6.5. This traffic is slightly below the peak traffic 
level of 76.6 million tonnes experienced in 2000, but 2004 marks the second consecutive 
year in which the total volume of traffic handled by the Port of Vancouver has 
                                                 
23. This employment is generated by five Port related sectors – maritime cargo, cruise industry, capital 
investment in Port facilities, shipbuilding and repair and non-maritime enterprises. 
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increased24. From 2000 to 2002, total traffic declined 18%, equivalent to 13.8 million 
tonnes, due largely to the global recession. However, since 2002 the total volume of 
cargo shipped has rebounded strongly, increasing 10.8 million tonnes in two years, an 
increase of approximately 17% (InterVISTAS Consulting 2005). 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Volume of Port of Vancouver Cargo (1985-2004) 
 
Bulk cargo 25 makes up the majority of cargo tonnage passing through the Port, 
accounting for 77% of total tonnage in 2004. Break bulk26 on the other hand, accounted 
for only 4% while containerized cargo27 accounted for 19% of total cargo (InterVISTAS 
Consulting 2005).  
                                                 
24. The total volume of maritime cargo shipped through the Port of Vancouver in 2005, was 76.5 million 
tonnes. (Foreign exports = 64.5 million tonnes. Foreign imports = 8.4 million tonnes. Domestic traffic = 3.6 
million tonnes). 
25. Bulk cargo: That which is generally shipped in volume where the transportation conveyance is the only 
external container; such as liquids, ore, or grain (http://www.about.com).  
26. Break bulk: Any commodity that, because of its weight, dimensions, or non-compatibility with other 
cargo, must be stowed directly into a ship’s hold (http://www.about.com). 
27. Container: A truck trailer body that can be detached from the chassis for loading onto a vessel, a rail 
car, or stacked in a container depot. Containers may be ventilated, insulated, refrigerated, flat rack, vehicle 
rack, open top, bulk liquid, dry bulk, or other special configurations. Typical containers may be 20 feet, 40 
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Containerized cargo has been the fastest growing and probably the most fascinating 
segment at the Port of Vancouver (see Figure 6.6): Container TEUs28 have increased 43% 
since 2000, and 835% since 1985. To put this into perspective, overall traffic has 
increased 31% since 1985. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6: The Port of Vancouver Containerized Cargo TEUs (1985-2004) 
 
With respect to tonnage, an estimated 14.1 million tonnes of goods were shipped via 
container through the Port of Vancouver in 2004. This represents a 41% increase from 
the amount shipped in 2000. Wood pulp is currently the largest single commodity that 
was containerized at the Port of Vancouver in 2004 and thereby overtaken lumber, with 
approximately 1.6 million tonnes shipped in 2004, an increase of 28% from 2000 
(InterVISTAS Consulting 2005). 
 
Containerized cargo at the Port of Vancouver is, however, much less concentrated than 
bulk and break bulk freight. The top three commodities account for only 29% of total 
                                                                                                                                                 
feet, 45 feet, 48 feet, or 53 feet in length, 8 feet or 8.5 feet in width, and 8.5 feet or 9.5 feet in height (The 
Worldbank, 2002). 
28. Twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs): Container size standard of twenty feet. Two twenty-foot 
containers (TEUs) equal one FEU. Container vessel capacity and port throughput capacity are frequently 
referred to in FEUs or TEUs (The Worldbank 2002). 
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container volume, compared to 70% and 90% of bulk and break bulk volume, 
respectively. This aspect of the breakdown reflects the advantage of containerization. 
Containerization makes the consolidation of multiple shippers’ goods into a single 
container possible, and so the export and import of goods by sea a cost competitive 
option (InterVISTAS Consulting 2005). 
 
6.5 The Port of Vancouver as a Seaport-cluster  
 
Not only does every economic activity have to be located somewhere; more significantly, 
there is also a very strong propensity for economic activities to form localized 
geographical clusters or agglomerations (Dicken 1998). In fact, the geographical 
concentration of economic activities, at a local or sub national scale is the norm not the 
exception.   
 
As mentioned earlier in 4.4, a port cluster was defined as a “set of interdependent firms 
engaged in port related activities, located within the same port region and possibly with 
similar strategies leading to competitive advantage and characterized by a joint 
competitive position vis-à-vis the environment external to the cluster” (Hazendonck 
2001:136), and has the following four main characteristics (de Langen 2004b:82): 
 
a) A cluster is a population of interdependent organizations. These organizations –
predominately firms- operate in the same value chain and have to some extent a shared 
competitive position. For that reason, they are interdependent; when one firm attracts 
business, other firms benefit, and when a firm goes bankrupted, other firms lose a 
customer or supplier [...] 
 
b) Clusters are geographically concentrated. Different clusters have different relevant 
cluster regions and can occur at a variety of scales: local, regional or interregional […] 
 
 
c) The cluster population consists of four kinds of organizations; business units, 
associations, public-private organizations, and public organizations. Business units may 
be organizational units of firms as a whole. For instance, business units of banks or 
insurance firms dealing with ships are included in a maritime cluster, not the bank or 
insurance firms as a whole [...] 
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d) The cluster population is linked by a core specialization. This notion is implicit in most 
studies on clustering and is necessary since the ‘chain’ of input-output relations is in 
principle endless […] 
 
 
If we compare these four characteristics however with a modern seaport agglomeration 
like the Port of Vancouver, you will find that the seaport community corresponds to the 
cluster-definition to great extent; The Port of Vancouver consists of several independent 
enterprises (see list bullets below) that work together to build the necessary linkages to 
make a competitive, efficient port that serve the North American economy (W.Gill, Vice 
President at SFU):  
 
• Chandlers and Suppliers 
• International Maritime Centre  
• Navigation and Pilotage 
• Shipyards and Repair 
• Arbitration  
• B.C. Chamber of Shipping (located in 
Vancouver City Downtown) 
• Bunkering/Lubricants  
• Environmental Services  
• Protection & Indemnity  
• Ship Loading  
• Stevedores 
• Tank & Bilge Cleaning 
 
For a comprehensive listing of marine services, please visit the Chamber of Shipping 
website29. The next section, will shortly introduce you to some of the stakeholders30 in 
the Port of Vancouver community.  
 
6.5.1 Stakeholders 
 
A port cluster as the Port of Vancouver may be a very complex entity, where a multitude 
of interacting and conflicting interests are involved (Hazendonck 2001, Goss 1990, 
Frankel 1989 and Heaver 1995). The concept of seaport cluster competition can therefore 
be analyzed from a large number of diverging perspectives. Indeed, multiple economic 
actors have an interest in the port sector and are involved in a variety of seaport activities. 
                                                 
29. http://www.chamber-of-shipping.com/index/about 
30. A stakeholder is often defined as “people who are (or might be) affected by any action taken by an 
organization or group”. Stakeholders, then, are more coherently described as "interest groups" (Wikipedia). 
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As a result, a port strategy analysis like this could be conducted in function of multitude 
of different and sometimes conflicting goals, associated with the various actors in the port 
cluster.  
 
In general terms, three categories of stakeholders –or otherwise interested- can be 
observed in the Port of Vancouver community (W.Gill; E. Tofsrud): government 
agencies, the port authority and the port companies. This last category is composed of 
two sub-categories. First, port operators directly engaged in logistics chain activities 
within the port, such as the loading and unloading of cargo, storage, distribution and 
related value added services (i.e. assembling, repacking and consolidating). Second, the 
actors engaged in those port related activities that would not conventionally be 
considered as part of the logistics chain in a strict sense, e.g. manufacturing firms31 
located in the port area, and acting as points of origin or destination of goods loaded or 
unloaded in the port (E. Tofsrud). Figure 6.7 illustrates the relations between cargo 
handling, transport and logistics activities. 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Relations between cargo handling, transport and logistics activities 
Source: Langen, P.W. de (2004b).  
 
Hence cargo handling, transport, logistics, and production functions (and sometimes 
certain trading activities) are strongly interrelated and comprise the ‘port cluster’ in 
                                                 
31. The Port of Vancouver is considered as an industrial zone due to its ability to handle and store raw 
materials such as lumber, coal (Westshore terminal), and sulphur (Pacific Coast Terminals). That is, when a 
cost minimization is crucial for competitive production, industrial activities locate in seaports and 
production activities are closely integrated with logistics and transport claims (de Langen 2004b). 
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Vancouver. Although trade is consistently the least linked part of the cluster, cargo 
handling, transport and logistics are all centrally related to the other cluster activities.  
Further detail on all these activities, indicating the types of firm they comprise, is 
provided in Table 6.2. The present study focuses primarily on port authorities and the 
port operators engaged in loading and discharging of cargo, because these actors are 
likely to benefit most from formal port strategy analysis and they are also the actors 
engaged most clearly and directly in intra-range competition among seaports. In this 
context it should be noted that port authorities are usually either the instigator, catalyst or, 
at minimum, the ‘impactees’ of government policy32. 
 
Another group of stakeholders being observed during the fieldwork, not discussed above, 
and not the direct focus of this study, includes the port customers. The North American 
ports increasingly have to deal with a concentration of power when purchasing both 
terminal operators’ services and other port services (Notteboom & Winkelmans 2001). 
Hence the behavior of global carriers and other major port clients should be seen as a key 
determinant of port competitiveness and as an important input for formal strategy 
analysis. However, this set of actors is viewed in the present study as external to the ‘port 
cluster’, except if it becomes involved in actual port operations, e.g. as a result of vertical 
integration.  
 
Finally it should be mentioned that the regional effects of port clusters in terms of 
employment and value added creation, as well as the growing concerns about transport 
externalities inflicted by ports on their environment, has resulted in increased societal 
demands imposed on ports and therefore on port strategy analysis per se.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32. Activities and services performed by port authorities are e.g. planning, expanding, modernizing and 
maintaining a port’s infrastructure, operating its own equipment and warehouses. 
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Table 6.2: The principal economic activities comprising the Vancouver port cluster 
 
Cargo handling 
system 
• Stevedoring suppliers (i.e. Western Stevedoring, PCDC 
Canada Ltd.) 
• Rail terminals (i.e. Canadian Pacific Railways, Burlington 
Northern Santa Fe Railway) 
• Towage (i.e. Pacific Towing Services Ltd.) and pilotage  
• Storage of goods (i.e. Cratex Container Sales,Metropolitan 
Container Repair) 
• Port engineering (i.e. Grand Marine Ltd.) 
 
Transport System • Shipping companies (i.e. ATG, China Shipping, COSCO) 
• Transport companies (CN, CP, AG Transport Ltd., Quantum 
Harbour Services, Cansea Transport) 
• Ship supplier (i.e. Courtney Agencies Ltd., Anglo Canadian 
Shipping) 
• Ship agents (i.e. Gearbulk,, Hanjiin Shipping)  
• Forwarding agents (i.e. Overseas Container Forwarding, 
Schenker of Canada Ltd.) 
• Maritime services (i.e. OASIS Marine Services, Burrard Clean 
Operations, Ship-owners Assurance Management) 
• Ship build/repair (i.e. Allied Shipbuilders Ltd., All-Sea 
Enterprises Ltd., Meridian Marine Industries Inc.) 
 
Logistics System • Logistics service providers (i.e. Batchelor Marine Consulting 
Services Inc., Pacific Northwest Ship and Cargo Services Inc., 
Chamber of Shipping) 
• Warehouse facilities (i.e. Coastal Containers Ltd.) 
• Logistics consultancy and ICT (i.e. SeaTrade Enterprises Inc., 
Seaport Consultants Canada Inc.) 
• Value Added services (i.e. Marine Industrial Security 
Services, equipment/materials handling; finance and 
accounting companies located in Vancouver) 
 
Production System • Production activities related to commodities (i.e. 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, Sultran Limited) 
• Supplier services for production 
 
Trade System • Trading companies for commodities (Delta Trading Ltd., 
Byrne Road Wholesale Lumber, New Skeena Forest Products 
Inc., Shell Canada Products) 
 
 
Source: The Author’s own work 
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6.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has attempted to provide the reader a short overview of the operations, trade, 
facilities and economic influence in the Port of Vancouver community before the main 
analysis is presented. It began with placing the Port of Vancouver geographically 
followed by a paragraph describing its role as a job generator before presenting 
Vancouver’s maritime cargo industry. Finally a short recapitulation demonstrated that the 
Port of Vancouver is a seaport cluster and thereby concluded the chapter. 
 
The next chapter will outline some of the local adjustments that the Port of Vancouver is 
making in the new age of containerization to remain competitive based on an in-depth 
investigation in 2005 in which the dialogue of ideas and evidence have been culminated 
in the representations of social life. Emphasis is put on their terminal upgrading and 
expansion plans, followed by an analysis in Chapter 7.  
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7. Preparing for the Future 
 
 
 
Paradoxically, the enduring competitive advantages in a global economy lie increasingly in local 
things – knowledge, relationships, and motivation that distant rivals cannot match 
 
Michael E. Porter (1998b) 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Competition has intensified dramatically over the last decades, in virtually all parts of the 
world. In past centuries ports were mainly used as instruments of state or colonial 
powers, and the ability to control port access was a means to controlling markets. There 
was hardly any competition between ports as they were regarded as “geographical 
monopolies”.  
 
While we now associate the absence of competition with developing economies, it is very 
easy to forget how much change that has taken place in advanced nations. Ports are no 
longer merely geographically determined places for loading and unloading cargo. Far 
more, the modern port operation is the basis for the integrated and sophisticated logistical 
system that the maritime industry is part of (Inoue 2002). “[…] the port has in fact 
become an interface between intercontinental transport and a place in the hinterland being 
considered for production, assembly or final distribution” (Jackobsen et al 2004:68).  
 
So how then, have this competition affected the Port of Vancouver and its strategies? 
Why are things as they are? This chapter will therefore look at the “local” adjustments 
the Vancouver Port is making to remain competitive as a seaport cluster on the West 
Coast in the new age of containerization. Emphasis is put on terminal upgrading and 
expansion plans. 
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7.2  B.C. Ports Strategy 
 
 
The Port of Vancouver is at a crossroads. Before us lies tremendous potential to capture 
economic growth and prosperity as a result of increasing Asia-Pacific trade. China, in 
particular, is reshaping the world economy and the Port of Vancouver is uniquely positioned to 
harness opportunities as a result. 
 
The Land Use Plan for the Port of Vancouver, 2005 
 
 
Obviously, it is an exciting time at the Port of Vancouver and an exciting time for world 
trade (B. Corsan, C. Badger). According to Captain Gordon Houston, the Port is probably 
poised upon the greatest period of expansion in its history with a forecast of 300 per cent 
growth in container volumes over the next 15 years, while contributing an additional $3.1 
billion to Canada’s GDP annually. However, there is a tremendous amount of work to be 
done to manage it effectively, both as a cluster manager33 and as a cluster coordinator.  
But more importantly, there are competitors who would like nothing more than to take it 
away from them.  
The good news, however, is that there is a plan for the Port of Vancouver and other 
gateway ports in British Columbia to capture the massive increase in international trade34. 
In fact, the plan at the Port of Vancouver is part of a broader strategy plan that the 
Government of British Columbia has recently completed. It is called the “B.C. Ports 
Strategy”35, and identifies not only the infrastructure development that must occur at 
Canada’s Pacific ports to capture the Asia Pacific trade opportunities, but also the public 
policy and competitiveness issues the Port of Vancouver must address to optimize its 
predicted growth,   
                                                 
33. The role of the port authority is discussed frequently (see Goss 1990; Stevens 1999), but not from the 
perspective that a port is a cluster, where collective action problems have to be solved. Of this reason, I 
claim that the ‘institutional position’ of the port authority can be described with the term ‘cluster manager’. 
34. Vancouver Board of Trade Luncheon Conference, Nov. 24th, 2005. 
35. B.C. Port System: The B.C. port system is a multimodal transportation network that includes six 
Canada Port Authority (CPA) ports that are part of the National Ports System and many other 
public/private harbors under local administration, Port terminals, Transcontinental railways in Canada and 
the U.S. (e.g. CN, CPR, Burlington Northern Santa Fe), National highway system and other regional and 
local roads. 
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A working partnership between our ports and the federal and provincial governments will 
ensure that the British Columbia port system can respond to the opportunities created by 
unprecedented growth in containerized traffic to and from China and other Asia-Pacific 
countries, and expected growth in cruise and bulk traffic through our ports (B.C. Ports 
Strategy 2005:1). 
 
To give this port development a rolling start, the British Columbia Government has 
already taken action by providing: 
  
• $2.5 million property tax relief for port terminal operators to stimulate new investment; 
• $400 million investment in road infrastructure in the Lower Mainland which will benefit 
port traffic; 
• significant investment for strategic port development including $17 million to create new 
container handling capacity at the Port of Prince Rupert; 
• $2.5 million support for the development of British Columbia as a cruise destination. 
These investments confirm that the development of the international trade hub on the 
North American west coast is of a noteworthy priority of the Government of British 
Columbia (B.C. Ports Strategy 2005). That is, in addition to pursue policies to benefit and 
stabilize the economies as a whole, they are now attempting to create an environment in 
which Canadian West Coast ports can upgrade competitive advantages in established 
industries by introducing more sophisticated technologies and methods and penetrating 
more advanced segments. The Government of British Columbia has as a matter of fact 
become a catalyst and a challenger to encourage –or even push- Canadian ports to raise 
their aspirations and in so doing move them to higher levels of competitive performance 
rather than a passive participant of international competition.  
“I can’t tell you how significant this attention is. It is unprecedented and shows 
recognition of the West is important. In fact, there are many who believe that the 
economic power in this country is shifting west, that our national leaders no longer see 
the country’s economic power base in the manufacturing industries of eastern Canada, 
but in the resource and trading economies of western Canada. I can’t tell you if this is the 
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case. But I can tell you that we have greater federal support for the expansion of our 
gateway than ever before. And that is a very good thing - for Canada, for B.C. and for all 
of us here who work at the Port of Vancouver” (Captain Gordon Houston at the Annual 
Workshop on Railway Issues 2005). 
 
However, while their role in creating and sustaining regional advantage is significant, the 
Government can only play a role that is inherently partial, and that only succeeds when 
working in tandem with favorable underlying conditions in the “Porterian diamond” in 
accordance with Michael Porter’s cluster theory. To put it differently, if the Port of 
Vancouver wants the economy to grow... if they want to take advantage of trade 
opportunities with China... and if they want to exploit their position as “a natural 
gateway” between North America and Asia (Tofsrud, Corsan), the Port of Vancouver and 
its stakeholders have to move quickly, decisively and strategically together as one team to 
achieve productivity growth (as illustrated in Figure 7.1 below).  
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Determinants of productivity and productivity growth in the Port of Vancouver 
Source: Based on M. Porter (1998a) 
 
The first goal is thus to make sure they have enough terminal capacity to meet future 
demand by 2020 and thereby enable the Port to maintain its strong, competitive position 
as a North American gateway for container trade. That is, virtually any competitive 
advantage can be replicated sooner or later if the Port of Vancouver rests on its laurels 
(Chris Badger), - including container terminal facilities. Therefore, in order to keep pace 
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with the expanding world economies, the opening markets in Asia and the increasing 
capacity needs of its customers, the Port of Vancouver has to become a moving target and 
create new advantages at least as fast as competitors can replicate old ones. But more 
important, their terminal facilities must continuously be improved and upgraded.  
 
VPA’s overall expansion strategy consists therefore of a three-pronged approach to 
increase B.C.’s competitiveness as a trading partner in the Pacific Northwest container 
market; 
 
i) Increasing production at existing terminals 
ii) Expanding existing facilities 
iii) Exploring options for new facilities  
 
Two of the biggest expansion projects takes place at Roberts Bank in Delta, - 35 
kilometres south of Vancouver’s inner harbour - (B. Corsan) to facilitate the forecasted 
traffic growth. The plan, in its simplicity, is to construct an additional berth and storage 
yard at the existing two-berth container terminal to expand its container handling 
facilities from 900,000 TEUs a year to an anticipated capacity of 1,300,000 TEUs by 
2008 (see Figure 7.2). The proposed third berth, more known as the “Deltaport Third 
Berth Project” (the Project), will therefore provide the VPA, and the existing terminal 
operator, TSI, with the increased container capacity that is required to address the 
increasing container trade demand within North America. The second proposed 
development project at Roberts Bank involves the development of a new three-berth 
container terminal known as “Terminal 2” which will add about two million TEUs of 
container capacity to the Port of Vancouver by 202036. 
 
Collectively, these suggested projects will increase the Port of Vancouver’s terminal 
capacity by 3.6 million TEUs to a total of 5.3 million TEUs by 2020. That is, not only are 
all five suggested projects required to serve forecasted growth but also to enhance the 
competitiveness of British Columbia. Furthermore, the upgrading process will provide 
                                                 
36. http://www.portvancouver.com/container_expansion/deltaport/index.html 
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significant socio-economic benefits to the region’s workers, businesses and local 
communities (B. Corsan).  
 
 
         
 
 
Figure 7.2: Roberts Bank Development Plan 
Source: The Port of Vancouver 
However, even though the Port of Vancouver is working to advance all five of the 
expansion projects, the future is definitively not as water tight as they may sound, which 
Chapter 8 will demonstrate. (B. Corsan, S. Brown, R. Sol).  
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7.3 Conclusion 
 
Economic geography in an era of global competition, then, involves a paradox. In an 
economy with rapid transportation and communication and accessible global markets, 
location remains fundamental to competition, - albeit in different ways at the turn of the 
twenty first century than in earlier decades.  
 
This chapter has shown that the Government of British Columbia together with the 
Vancouver Port Authorities has attempted to develop a strategy to capture economic 
growth and prosperity as a result of increasing Asia-Pacific trade. Government’s most 
basic role in this process is to establish the overall microeconomic rules and incentives 
governing competition that will encourage to growth, while the Port of Vancouver will 
attempt to sustain a competitive advantage through improved terminal facilities and 
expansion plans. 
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8. Just a Pawn in the Game of Commerce? 
 
 
 
Here’s a sobering thought. For all of the noise we make about the huge impact that China is 
having on our economy, we’re actually number 17 on their list of trading partners. We account 
for only about 1% of their exports, and about 60% year-over-year growth in international trade 
volumes. So imagine the impact of doubling or tripling our trade with the world’s fastest growing 
economy. Imagine what it would mean for our ports, our railways, our roads and distribution 
centers with today’s infrastructure and today’s legislation. We’re already struggling to keep up 
with our 1 per cent share of China’s export trade. Something must be done if we still want to be 
in the transpacific game. 
 
Captain Gordon Houston, 
 Vancouver Board of Trade, 2005 
 
 
8.1  Introduction 
 
The container brought about two major changes in international trade flows (Levinson 
2006). First, says Levinson, it facilitated the physical movement of freight across many 
transport modes. Developed initially as a means of speeding up dockside cargo transfers 
onto ships and reducing the amount of time vessels spend in port, the container is now a 
feature of all major transport modes, expect for pipelines. Maritime transport is still at the 
heart of container movements, but whereas the port used to be the major point of 
interruption (and frequently the major bottleneck) in long-distance cargo flows, today it is 
but one of many links in an inter-modal transportations chain (Vancouver Maritime 
Museum, Jackobsen 2003).  
 
The second major development says Levinson, has been in the organization of trade. A 
growing proportion of containerized trade is being handled on a door-to-door basis, from 
point of production to the point of consumption (Jackobsen 2003, Levison 2006). The 
physical ease with which the container can be transferred from one mode to another is 
being matched by the emergence of large enterprises that offer a complete service from 
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the point of origin to the final destination, - a trend which implies that the Port of 
Vancouver no longer can expect to attract shipping lines because they are a so-called 
“natural gateway” to rich hinterlands. The result then is that the Port is becoming 
marginal in the routing of container flows despite its enormous terminal investments. The 
shipping lines have become the major actors in world trade in non-bulk commodities and 
because they operate on a global scale they possess a more varied choice of ports of call 
than ever before. That is, they decide on landward routing in conjunction with their 
service networks in maritime space. The consequence is that hinterland and foreland (the 
overseas destinations) have come together in an unprecedented fashion; “A new 
geography of container flows has been fashioned” to cite Hayuth (1985). And nowhere is 
this better exemplified than in North-America and Canada, where micro-bridge rail 
services permit the carriers to concentrate cargoes at load center ports on the particular 
maritime range that best serves the global interests of the company or consortium. The 
question then, what is the consequence of this global development, and how does it affect 
the federal Port of Vancouver? 
 
So far, this analysis has been examining the Port of Vancouver’s terminal upgrading. 
This chapter, however, examines the plight of public monopoly ports and will therefore 
take a closer look at the collective action to facilitate the predicted transpacific container 
growth, or in this case the lack of collective action (?), between the private and public 
actors at the Port of Vancouver, and how the growing transpacific trade affects its 
transport infrastructure. 
 
8.2 The Effect 
 
Publicly-owned ports have become a very large share of the costs of containerization 
trend. Certainly, shipping lines (such as Hanjin and Hapag Lloyd) have made 
considerable investments in new vessels and boxes themselves, but the enormous factor 
costs incurred in improving and upgrading port facilities, i.e. developing new terminal 
sites, dredging approach channels, purchasing gantry cranes and yard handling 
equipment, are provided at public expense by the local port corporation in Vancouver 
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(anonymous referee). Some costs, however, have been borne or shared by its terminal 
operators and the lines themselves (G. Baxter, B. Pottinger). Among them, P&O Ports 
Terminals37, - one of the leader firms in the Vancouver port community (B. Corsan) that 
to a great extent show ability and incentives to make investments with positive effects for 
other firms in the seaport cluster, (in addition to the Vancouver Port Authority) - that 
recently has invested as much as $155 million dollars in infrastructure, equipment and 
operating systems to improve its capacity, efficiency and customer service. “Both 
terminal operators [P&O Ports and Terminal Systems] have been able to achieve the 
highest throughput in Western North America based on terminal footprint” (B. Corsan). 
Their new facilities, including five gantry cranes, six deep-sea berths, 16 one over five 
RTG’s, an automated truck gate and a sophisticated operating system that tracks cargo in 
real time (NAVIS)38, makes Centerm one of the most sophisticated container terminals 
on the West coast, and in this way demonstrates that a ‘true’ leader firm can add to the 
quality of governance in the Vancouver seaport cluster in accordance with de Langen’s 
theories on cluster governance. Figure 8.1 below shows this mechanism schematically 
(Wijnolst, N. 2003). 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Leader firm behavior impact on the competitiveness of a seaport cluster 
 
                                                 
37. P&O Ports Canada Inc., a DP World company is the container terminal operator and stevedore of 
choice for many of the world’s shipping lines and marine consortia. 
38. Source: 
http://portal.pohub.com/portal/page?_pageid=347,1,347_111366:347_111424&_dad=pogprtl&_schema=P
OGPRTL 
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But despite the magnitude of the costs involved to improve the Port of Vancouver’s 
performance against its existing advantages39, no major port has been able to resist the 
challenge of containerization. Nor has the Port of Vancouver (Armitage 2001; Vancouver 
Maritime Museum, B. Gee). The container berth has therefore come to represent the 
hallmark of responsibility in port business. For workers, of course, this has all been a 
mixed blessing. That is, as consumers, they enjoy infinitely more choices thanks to the 
global trade the container has stimulated. As wage earners, on the other hand, workers 
have every reason to be ambivalent.  
 
The problem, however, is that West Cost ports as Vancouver can no longer be sure that 
there will be any benefits from capital investments made in container facilities as inter–
port competition has increased greatly and the monopoly position that the port authority 
was set up to administer in the public good has started to crumble dramatically (because 
traffic of traditional hinterland regions no longer can be guaranteed due to the continental 
port competition) (W. Gill, E. Tofsrud). The result, then, is that the Port of Vancouver 
has to make significant investments without any degree of assurance that traffic will 
increase. The only guarantee they have is that unless there is a competitive container 
handling facility available there will be little or no container traffic from the Pacific 
Rime. But does that mean that they should stop investing in terminal facilities? That is, -
is the Port of Vancouver really willing to face the next generation of Canadians in 10 or 
15 years and say they had the greatest economic development in a century but did not 
take advantage of it because they failed to think big (C. Badger, B. Wilds, R. Sol)? 
Shouldn’t they be striving to grow? Shouldn’t they be striving to increase their market 
share? Shouldn’t they be striving to enhance their position as one of the world’s great 
trading economies? Captain Gordon Houston puts it in this way; 40 
There are few jurisdictions in the world better positioned than we are. But we have to be 
bullish to achieve a dominant share in today’s rapidly growing marketplace. And we have 
                                                 
39. The VPA’s container expansion strategy represents one of the largest capital projects contemplated in 
B.C. in several years, and likely require investment of some $ 1.5 billion by the VPA and its strategic 
partners. 
40. Captain Gordon Houston at the Vancouver Board of Trade, 2005. The speech is also available on the 
web: http://www.boardoftrade.com/vbot_speech.asp?pageID=174&speechID=848&offset=&speechfind= 
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to take advantage of the factors working in our favour. The fact is the Port of Vancouver 
is the most competitive gateway between the producer economies of Asia and the 
consumer economies of North America. We are the closest major deep-water port to 
Asia. We have competitive labour costs, excellent rail links to key Canadian and U.S. 
markets, a better balance between inbound and outbound cargo than any of our 
competitors, and a reputation for customer service. 
 
 
“[…] we’re leaving none of this to chance. We’re dedicating our resources and our 
energies to making sure it happens” (C. Badger). But equally important, they have to start 
acting as a team and increase the quality of the seaport cluster (E. Knoph), - quality so 
defined as that a higher quality leads to a better performance- , if they still want to be part 
of the transportation game. Badger continues, 
 
But if the Port of Vancouver is going to compete and win as a gateway, as a province and 
as a country, we must believe in ourselves, and aggressively pursue trading relationships 
that position Vancouver and B.C. as the natural bridge between North America and Asia. 
We can credible get there, but we have to think “big” 
 
This is a very important message for their overseas trading partners to hear; - i) that 
Canada’s government leaders are fully committed to do what is required in expanding 
trade with Asia (as illustrated in Chapter 7), and ii) that the Port of Vancouver is doing 
their best in order to accommodate the predicted container growth. 
I know it’s a message that Chinese President Hu Jintao heard loud and clear when he 
visited Vancouver this September [2005]. During his time in Canada, President Hu said 
this: “The Canadian government [has] introduced the important strategy of building a 
Pacific Gateway, mapping out the plan for developing a trade, investment and 
transportation hub oriented toward the Pacific Rim region.” I appreciate this vision, 
which I believe will give greater impetus to the economic and technological cooperation 
between Canada and the Asia-Pacific.” 
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Obviously, President Hu’s words are encouraging; in fact, his very presence in 
Vancouver should send a powerful signal to all of them about China’s interest in doing 
business with Canada. 
Yet (notwithstanding their tremendous potential to capture economic growth), the whole 
situation is [...] “somewhat analogous to a lottery where only those who purchase tickets 
have a chance of winning, however small those odds may be” (Brian Slack 1993:582). 
That is, despite the enormous costs the Port of Vancouver have been invested in the 
terminal upgrading process to sustain competitive and their many attempts to act 
collectively to facilitate the predicted traffic growth, VPA finds themselves less and less 
in control of their destinies (anonymous) due to consortium and partnership agreements 
among its private-owned port clients (E. Tofsrud, E. Knoph). That is, although Sea 
Land’s predecessor, Pan Atlantic Steamship was a one owner operator, and such 
companies as Evergreen and Maersk were begun as family concerns, the majority of the 
container shipping companies today started as consortium of liner companies in the 1960s 
or 1970s writes McCalla (1999). The rationale for the “new” alliances is the same as in 
the formation of consortia in the beginning of containerization; - they all share the risk of 
investment in capital equipment. What marks the cooperation in evidence today among 
the container shipping companies, however, compared to the 1960s, is the scale, 
geographical and otherwise, at which it operates. Where originally cooperative ventures 
operated on individual trade routes, today they operate at the world scale. An estimate by 
the Containerization International Yearbook suggests that the companies in the major 
alliances control nearly 1/3 of the world’s shipboard TEU capacity. The concentration of 
assets is especially noticeable on the three major East/West container routes (Europe Far 
East; Europe North America and Far East North America) where it is estimated that 
companies involved in four alliances control as much as 50 per cent of the capacity41. But 
at what price?  
 
Ports of call, including that of the Port of Vancouver, are continuously threatened and 
traditional service networks are continually changed as alliance members consolidate 
                                                 
41. Robert J. McCalla in Journal of Transport Geography 7 (1999) 247-254 
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their cargo in a limited number of ports. Yet (as Slack 1993 also indicates) the shipping 
lines demand even larger container terminals, with ever deeper channels, equipped with 
even more expensive and sophisticated handling gear at a time when the economic 
benefits accruing from such investments are declining, and clients of long standing are 
demonstrating little loyalty in maintaining their business activities in the port 
(anonymous referee). The Port of Vancouver has in fact become what Brian Slack calls a 
“pawn” in a global game of commerce were private owned shipping lines constantly can 
‘free-ride’ on the cooperative efforts of others.  
 
This situation is probably amongst the most vexing problems for the Canadian local port 
authorities today and especially for publicly-owned ones as the Port of Vancouver since 
its local cluster adjustments (as illustrated in Chapter 7) is highly necessary to remain 
competitive today (B. Corsan). But as a private-public organization the Port of 
Vancouver has (not surprisingly perhaps?) relatively high set up costs and uncertain pay-
offs, and as a consequence is vastly depended on substantial support from the government 
to ensure that customers in the hinterlands (tributary areas) are not abused by a private 
monopoly but rather being operated in the public interest42. So how then can the Port of 
Vancouver possibly justify the growing demands for capital investments by the 
government that may lead to both i) a reduction in port-induced employment and ii) 
which not be justified by any guarantee of stable port clients (or traffic growth)?43 It is 
not shock, therefore, that many port bodies in the twenty-first century (see Slack 1993) 
including the Port Vancouver have chosen to use a so-called “Economic Impact 
Analysis” to measure the wider economic benefits ascribed to its port activity in an 
attempt to impress higher authorities and the public to obtain additional funding or to 
encourage other stakeholders to invest in the “marine community” in order to sustain its 
competitive position. In the ‘Economic Impact Update’ prepared by InterVISTAS 
                                                 
42. Under federal legislation, the authorities that run Canada’s major ports enjoy significant autonomy in 
day-to-day operations but their access to capital - including their ability to borrow - is tightly restricted 
43. in VPA annual report 2004 
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Consulting for the Port of Vancouver in 2005, they provided the reader (i.e. the higher 
authorities) measures of economic impact including44:  
 
• Employment and wages generated by the Port of Vancouver and Port related 
businesses; 
• GDP and Economic Output contribution of the Port of Vancouver to the British 
Columbian and Canadian economy; 
• Taxes and fees paid to the federal, provincial and municipal governments. 
 
The results have been noteworthy45. In October, Federal Transportation Minister Jean 
Lapierre announced a $590 million investment in the Pacific Gateway program46 after 
several meetings with the Port of Vancouver among others (The National Post). He went 
so far as to call it a “down payment” on the federal government’s commitment to 
transportation infrastructure and other requirements necessary to achieve Canada’s Asia-
Pacific trade goals. Furthermore, as can be seen from the Figure 8.2 below, Transport 
Canada announced to raise the port’s borrowing limit to $510-million from $225-million 
in February 2005 which is seen as a crucial move to the port’s recently announced plan 
for a $1.4-billion upgrade to its container terminal facilities.  
 
                                                 
44. For further information, please visit: 
http://www.portvancouver.com/the_port/docs/Economic_Impact_Study.pdf 
45. Canadian Transportation Agency and the Railway Association of Canada. (2005). Canada’s Railways: 
Emerging Issues; Clear Options, 9th CTA/RAC Annual Workshop on Railway Issues. Montreal. April 
14th, 2005 
46. Pacific Gateway Program is a program designed to enhance prosperity and strengthen Canada’s 
position in international commerce by further developing the Pacific Gateway. 
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Figure 8.2: Increase in borrowing limit.  
 
Besides, it allows the port to raise financing without having to get federal approval for 
every dime, according to the B.C. Business Council, a leading business lobby group47. 
But although the role of federal government in creating and sustaining advantage is 
significant for the seaport cluster as a whole, it is seen as inevitably partial for the Port’s 
future success. That is, the government does affect local advantage by shaping or 
influencing the context and institutional structure surrounding the Port of Vancouver (i.e. 
increasing the borrowing limit) but (un)fortunately firms compete in industries, not 
nations. The only way firms, or in this case the Port, can gain a competitive advantage is 
through improvement, innovation and upgrading done by the Port itself, - often described 
as the never-ending process. This involves not only the progress in executing existing 
advantages but also widening and upgrading the bases of competitive advantage over 
time. The next section will therefore take a closer look at how the Port of Vancouver 
attempts to create a competitive advantage. 
 
 
                                                 
47. National Post, Feb 9th, 2005 
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8.3 The Option: From Internal to External Sources of Success 
 
 
The competitive position of a seaport is in fact a matter of commercial attitude, mentality, 
entrepreneurial culture and the ability to build competitive advantages through the development 
of core competencies 
 
Chris Badger, Vice President, the Port of Vancouver 
 
 
In recent decades, thinking about the influence of location on competition has taken a 
relatively simply view of how companies compete. Competition has been seen as largely 
static and as resting on cost minimization in relatively closed economies in which a 
competitive advantage in factors of production is decisive, or, in the most recent analysis, 
economies of scale. This picture, however, fails to represent real competition; 
Competition is highly dynamic and rests on innovation and the search for strategic 
differences as this section attempts to demonstrate.  
 
Since it has become well known that the maritime container battle will be won on land, 
seaports that will succeed in the 21st century ought to be both ‘customer led’ and offer 
‘best-in-class’ performance. To put it differently, a seaport cluster as Vancouver can only 
outperform its rivals if it can establish a difference that it can preserve or by developing 
better services. The Port of Vancouver has therefore chosen to rest on two key strategies 
in obtaining a competitive advantage (or in this case, by improving the Port’s existing 
advantages); 
 
(i) flexibility to adapt quickly to changing opportunities, and  
(ii) An integral approach to logistics issues in transport chains (since the Port of 
Vancouver increasingly have to deal with large port clients who possess a 
strong bargaining power vis-a -vis terminal operations and inland transport 
operations).  
 
I will now discuss these two strategies. First out is the ability to change. 
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8.3.1 The Ability to Change 
 
[…] as a transportation industry, we must respond to the growth opportunities and competitive 
pressures we’re seeing in the marketplace today. If we don’t, we will not only lose the 
opportunities associated with expanding Canada’s international trade and domestic 
transportation sector. We run the risk of losing the market share we’ve worked so long and hard 
to develop to our competitors in the United States 
 
D. Bickel,  
Vancouver Board of Trade, 2005.  
 
The first element that was mentioned above is probably the most critical but also the most 
necessary underlying success factor in obtaining a competitive advantage: the ability to 
change (B.Wilds, C. Badger, B. Corsan). To some extent, this evolution is a function of 
macroeconomic turbulence, but above all, it increasingly has to do with the speed of 
evolution in the port’s sophisticated and demanding users. Proximity, both physical and 
cultural, to these clients, creates an enormous pressure to local businesses (including the 
Port itself) to meet high, and often new, standards in terms of product quality, features 
and service. Sustaining advantage requires therefore an ability to change. Continuously 
change states D. Bickel. It demands that a seaport cluster exploits, rather than ignores, 
new trends. It requires the port to even destroy old advantages to create new, higher-order 
ones. And it demands that Vancouver invests to close off the avenues along which 
competitors could attack. Korean shipbuilding firms did not become international leaders 
until they aggressively expanded the scale of their shipyards, moved to adopt new 
building techniques that substantially boosted productivity by reducing labour content, 
and developed the technical capabilities to build more sophisticated vessels. All these 
steps reduced the importance of labour costs at a time when Korean firms still enjoyed a 
labour cost advantage. To put it differently, if the Port of Vancouver fails to take this 
painful and seemingly paradoxical counterintuitive step, other competitors will do it for 
them -sooner or later. This is precisely why the Port attempts to become what Michael 
Porter calls a “moving target” on the West Coast and why they spend a lot of time and 
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energy in preparing the future as virtually any advantage can be replicated sooner or later 
if they rest on its laurels.  
 
At the same time however, the ability to change strategy is a costly affair (R. Sol, W. 
Gill). For that reason, those managing to overcome inertia and the barriers to change and 
upgrade advantage are most often those that have been stimulated by competitive 
pressure, buyer demands or technical threats. ”Few companies make significant 
improvements and strategy changes voluntary” (Porter 1998a:52). For the Port of 
Vancouver, however, it is seen as a highly necessary process, as mentioned earlier, since 
they do not have enough terminal capacity in the first place to facilitate the forecasted 
tripling of container volumes. The cluster upgrade is in other words a “must” for the port 
community if they the want the economy to grow and if they want to take advantage of 
the trade opportunities with China. And especially, if they want to compete against other 
West Coast ports such as the Ports of Seattle and Tacoma (E. Tofsrud, W. Gill).  
But the ability to change-strategy also implies that the Port of Vancouver must undertake 
searching and realistic appraisals of how they can improve other parts of their business 
environment, such as the road and railway system, that often represent the binding 
constraints to competitiveness in seaports (Vancouver Board of Trade 2005, R. Sol). 
Houston puts it like this at the Vancouver Board of Trade Conference;  
 
“There is just no sense building new container terminals if we don’t have the road and 
rail links to move Canadian exports to our gateway, or import cargo quickly and 
efficiently inland to its final destination!”  
 
Hinterland access is therefore crucial for the attractiveness of seaports (see Kreukels and 
Wever 1998) but compared to the U.S. (see Table 8.1) the Port of Vancouver has some 
significant work to do in this area according to Erik Knoph and Steven Brown. The Port 
of Vancouver’s future success will for that reason depend on encouraging the private 
sector to invest in factor conditions to stay competitive (B.C. Ports Strategy 2005). Not 
only does the Port of Vancouver have a great deal to gain if the transportation industries 
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can respond to the huge increase in Asia-Pacific trade forecast over the next decade and 
thereby increase the quality of the hinterland regime. They also have a great deal to lose  
 
Table 8.1: Canada-U.S. Port Comparison 
 
U.S. Port System Canada/the Port of Vancouver Port 
System 
Ports are local government agencies and 
viewed as a requirement for industrial support 
-no explicit recognition of the importance of 
marine transport to the economy in the 
National Marine Policy 
- ready to access to local government funding - different property tax regimes 
- raise taxes for port development - pay stipends to federal government 
- direct federal investment - no federal investment 
- tax- exempt municipal bond financing - taxable market debt financing 
- federal government investing in port security - limited federal investment in port security 
 
Source: Ministry of Small Business and Economic Development and Ministry of Transportation. (2005) 
 
if their “community members”, as Bennet calls it, cannot respond effectively in creating 
physical infrastructure, and particularly the port’s reputation (S. Brown , E. Knoph). 
More important perhaps, the quality of coordination in the cluster will decrease (and thus 
collective action will not arise); 
 
I believe that all of the players in Canada’s transportation network have a vital role to 
play to prepare our nation to compete on the international stage in the years ahead. It’s 
not just ports and railways. It’s our trucking companies and distribution partners. It’s our 
customers here in Canada and overseas. And it’s the communities that host Canada’s 
international ports (Captain Gordon Houston at the CTA/RAC Annual Workshop 2005).                                                    
This is why the Port of Vancouver and the Greater Vancouver Gateway Council48 have 
put such a pressure on the private railway companies (i.e. CN and CP) since they are 
considered as an essential component of the transportation system, but also because they 
are vital to the success of port operations in the Greater Vancouver area (C. Badger, E. 
Knoph, B. Wilds). Equally important is that the fate of the economy of B.C. will be 
increasingly tied to the costs and efficiency of Greater Vancouver’s transportation 
facilities since Vancouver’s role as an international gateway for Canada will continue to 
                                                 
48. The Gateway Council is comprised of senior executives from industry and government who subscribe 
to a common vision that Greater Vancouver become the Gateway of Choice for North America. 
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grow in the coming future. Finally, the railways companies are one of few members, 
which are able to make investments that can contribute with positive externalities for 
other members in the cluster - due to their size, market position, knowledge and 
entrepreneurial skills - and in this way being able to stimulate the competitiveness of the 
whole network. But even though cooperation to achieve common goals and economic 
growth would be beneficial for all community-members involved and a large part of the 
benefits of a more competitive network/cluster can end up in the railway companies’ own 
pockets, as de Langen and Nijdam (2003) would put it, cooperation has not developed as 
they can ‘free-ride’ on the cooperative efforts of others, or simply because the railway 
companies are risk-averse when confronted with uncertainty and enormous capital 
investments. Various solitudes and divergent priorities characterize therefore the present 
situation, as summarized below:  
 
The Port Authorities are naturally dependent on concerted actions and are already aligned 
with objectives for growth in the system. As landlords, they have much to grain from 
overall rail efficiency and effectiveness by being in a stronger position to attract shipping 
lines. The shipping lines, on the other hand, are naturally indifferent to Vancouver 
Gateway issues. They are the customers for this market and will be attracted by reliable 
service and low costs. Their ships, like water on which they float, will follow the path of 
least resistance. The terminal operators, however, are primarily focused on their own 
local concerns despite multi-national ownership, striving for market share within the port 
in which complexity is introduced in terms of coordinated arrangements that would 
require sharing benefits with a competitor. The railways; CN, CPR and BNSF (the class 1 
Railways) are competitors on the North American scale and highly driven by market 
share. BC Rail Port Subdivision and SRYBC have minor positions in the global market, 
but they do have much to gain by being focused on market size. VIA, AMTRAK, West 
Coast Express and Rocky Mountaineer Rail tours have local focus and are indifferent to 
market share issues for freight as long as their plans can be accommodated. Railway 
motivations are therefore very complex because their main assets they have are people, 
infrastructure, motive power and rolling stock and work together by necessity rather than 
by choice. Finally, the City of Vancouver. Vancouver is a special case due to its historic 
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role of the Waterfront and False Creek Flats. Local land use, public response to trains, 
and traffic issues dominate their interest; and, there is continuing pressure to free up 
existing railway lands for urban development. Table 8.2 below shows the various 
initiatives/investments to improve the hinterland access regime in the Port of Vancouver.  
 
Table 8.2: Initiatives/investments to improve the hinterland access regime in the Port of Vancouver 
 
Mode of coordination Relevant initiatives/investments 
Hierarchies No single firm has made major investments that have 
improved the hinterland accessibility.  
Interfirm alliances The number of strategic alliances to improve the hinterland 
accessibility is very limited.  
Associations Canadian Association of Importers and Exporters, B.C. 
Trucking Association, the Railway Association of Canada 
B.C., Chamber of Shipping, and Chamber of Commerce, 
promote the interests of their members. They are not actively 
lobbying for more infrastructures or a better interface with 
the terminals. 
Public-private partnerships The Port of Vancouver is probably the most influential actor 
among the private-public partnerships and has recently 
attempted to create an alliance together with the private 
railway companies such as CN and CP in order to improve 
the B.C. hinterland accessibility. The terminal operators, 
however, are primarily focused on their own local concerns 
despite multi-national ownership but ain’t pushing the 
railway companies to do something about the current 
situation. 
Public organizations Greater Vancouver Gateway Council, Pacific Gateway 
Transport Canada, WESTAC, and the B.C. Business Council 
(the lobbyist among these three) are among the most 
important public organizations in the hinterland access 
regime. 
Private organizations Railway companies such as CN and CPR has recently 
invested a small amount of money in their system and rolling 
stock. But this is not enough.  
 
Source: The Author 
 
The second strategy that was mentioned in the beginning - which is probably the most 
complex one - will be discussed in the next paragraph.  
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8.3.2 An Integral Approach to logistics issues in transportation 
chains 
 
Together as a transportation chain, we need to determine whether a different model is required. 
 
Capt. Norman Stark 
TSI Terminal Systems Inc. 
 
Although it is often asserted that at present no true global logistics service provider 
exists, one cannot deny that the top forwarding and transport groups have networks of 
offices and freight handling facilities that stretch around the world. Major container port 
clients such as Hanjin Shipping are looking for-end-to-end solutions and thus consider 
the Port of Vancouver merely as a sub-system in their own logistics chain. As can be seen 
in the quotation below, they [Hanjiin], among others, concentrate their service packages 
not on the port’s sea-to-land interface itself but rather on the quality and reliability of the 
entire transport chain. That is, they want to know their cargo is moving quickly, 
efficiently and reliably from origin to destination. And they want to know that every step 
in the chain — from shipping lines to terminal operations to railways and trucks —  
is integrated and optimized. Port clients as such hold therefore a post which increases 
both the pressure on associations and other public-private organizations to be effective;  
In addition to providing a first class domestic transportation network throughout North 
America, Hanjin Logistics will become the premier global provider of supply chain 
management solutions. Our ability to integrate supply chain management with 
transportation and information technology management allows us to provide our 
customers with custom designed logistics packages that address the customers 
'requirements. Our vendor neutral positioning allows us to provide a collaborative 
approach to supply chain management designed to drive cost out of the bottom-line, 
while enhancing profitability and customer service    
(www.hanjin.com/en/logistics/hjslogistics.jsp) 
But the fact, however, is that Port of Vancouver, - the main gateway for Asian trade -, is 
already struggling to cope with surging volumes of freight generated by the economic 
boom in China which, not surprisingly, cause concerns about the future reliability and the 
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quality of organizational infrastructure (National Post, 25 Feb, 2005). During the port 
backlog in 2005 for instance (see Figure 8.3), the largest container terminal operator at 
the congested Port of Vancouver, TSI,  had to take the unprecedented step of telling 
shipping lines to give it a break by unloading 25 per cent less cargo. (Ruth Sol, 
WESTAC49). “This is the first time we’ve ever done something like this,” explains 
Norman Stark, chief executive of TSI, which operates two of the three container 
terminals at Canada’s busiest port. According to Mr. Stark the problem was that CN was 
not delivering sufficient rail cars to take them away. But Mark Hallman, a spokesman for 
CN, denied the railway is at fault. “The fact of the matter is TSI has problems,” Mr. 
Hallman said. “They are constrained in terms of their own capacity. If ships are being 
delayed it is because TSI cannot unload them quickly enough. We had to deal with bad 
weather and other issues.” Days later CN agreed to increase rail car supply by several 
thousand feet from 11,000 feet a day (National Post, 25 Feb, 2005). 
Dennis Benikel, responsible for the supply chain at the Port of Vancouver Authority, 
claims that the entire supply chain in Canada must become more throughput-focused in 
order to avoid prospective bottlenecks. Not just that of the Port of Vancouver. “We must 
find new and innovative ways to enhance the throughput — or, in current 
terminology, the velocity — of the existing system” (D.Bickel). For the Port of 
Vancouver, this means making new standards and reliability. It means creating financial 
incentives for reliable and competitive service of performance for every partner in the 
logistics chain as an attempt to improve its quality. It means monitoring performance. 
And it means addressing problems in a timely way, and seeking continuous improvement 
(D. Bickel). Lofty ambitions — but that is where the Port of Vancouver has to go if they 
still want to be part of the container-transportation game claims Benikel. 
                                                 
49. The Western Transportation Advisory Council (WESTAC) is a forum dedicated to strengthening the 
Western Canadian economy through improving the region's transportation system. Founded in 1973, 
WESTAC maintains a cooperative approach to resolving issues. The Council organizes workshops, 
conferences and meetings to explore timely and relevant issues, and produces high quality publications on 
topics of importance to the Western Canadian economy (www.westac.com) 
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Figure 8.3: Port backlog 
 
 
So what happened after my interview with Mr. Benikel?  
 
Days later, the Vancouver Port Authority and two of the leader firms; P&O Ports Canada 
and TSI Terminal Systems Inc. announced collective plans to implement extended hours 
of operations at container terminal truck gates in the Port of Vancouver (D. Bickel; B. 
Corsan; C. Badger). The program is intended to increase truck gate operations at 
Vanterm, Centerm and Deltaport by an average of 20 per cent, per year, over the next 
five years, and is one of many examples of a broader initiative to increase hours of 
operation throughout the lower mainland ports and off-site terminals (Nov 24, 2005 the 
Port of Vancouver Newsletter). “Extending gate hour’s increases capacity helps to 
alleviate congestion at the terminals and speeds up transaction times. Extended hours of 
operations also make more efficient use of the region’s road networks by spreading truck 
traffic over a longer period, reducing congestion during traditional peak times and 
reducing emissions,” said Captain Chris Badger, the VPA’s Vice President, Customer 
Development and Operations. “However, if this initiative is going to be successful”, 
Badger continues, “The port will have to work closely with all stakeholders including the 
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shipping community, labour organizations, local municipalities and the provincial 
government”. 
 
So far having discussed some of the collective plans in the Port community and their two 
competitive strategies in order to increase the Port of Vancouver’s performance as a 
seaport cluster, the chapter will now go on to what I call the evaluation part in which 
several policy responses will be discussed as well as possible strategies that the public 
port authority might adopt to confront the competitive environment.  
 
8.4 What’s Next? 
 
So will the Port of Vancouver succeed? Are the competitive advantages good enough 
compared to other rival ports’ strategies? And what about the local port authority itself? 
Can they improve? Are they actually ready to face the transpacific containerization?  
 
According to Gordon Houston, president and chief executive officer of the Vancouver 
Port Authority opportunities have never been greater for Canada to benefit from the 
enormous growth in transpacific trade. But, as this thesis has attempted to demonstrate, 
there are challenges unlike any seen before; - especially when it comes to supply chain 
issues but also the ability of West Coast ports to actually meet the predicted container 
growth (F. Pasacreta). Can they make it? And how can you really prepare for a predicted 
future? To cite Captain Norman Stark, - the former president and CEO of the Vancouver 
Port Authority who now heads TSI Terminal Systems Inc., operator of Deltaport and 
Vanterm - “[…] I am always optimistic. I think the Port of Vancouver has a great future. 
When you see the other end of the funnel, you see that the opportunities are endless. The 
future is ours. It’s up to us. The challenge, however, first and foremost is one of sheer 
growth,” claims Capt. Stark, - noting that he recently visited the new Yangshan terminal 
at the mouth of China's Yangtze River. “At Yangshan” Stark says, “they have five berths 
completed already, three miles of terminals, 18 container cranes, and they have started 
work on another five berths. The plan is for 52 berths handling 26 million TEUs. And this 
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is only one terminal development. Compare their situation with what we are facing here. 
At TSI, on the other hand, we have been trying for years to get (environmental) approval 
to add one berth at Deltaport.” (Canada-Asia Maritime Conference, 2006). Therefore to 
get over the next couple of years; the whole supply chain will have to become even more 
efficient. Equally important, there must be a continuous working partnership between the 
Port, the federal - and provincial governments to solve any collective action problems in 
order to fully realize the vision to be the most competitive port system on the west coast 
of the Americas. 
 
The only worthy conclusion therefore, from my point of view, after going to through 
some of the material from the fieldwork, is that the Port of Vancouver has to become a 
catalyst, a leader and a driver of integrated action across the transportation system if they 
are to succeed in the coming future. They have to change their traditional role. More 
important, the local port authority must work closer than ever before with the shipping 
lines. Every dark cloud on an otherwise bright horizon has a silver lining. To put it 
differently, if the Port of Vancouver is going to benefit, there has to be a concerted effort 
to make sure everyone benefits. One suggestion is thus to adopt measures to ensure that 
the carriers become more deeply attached to them. An approach, employed by the U.S. 
ports, involves granting users very favorable terms such as reduced fees and habour dues, 
for long-term leases of terminals. Here the cashiers pay a substantial part of the 
development costs and equipment purchases. K-Line for instance recently signed an 
unprecedented 25 year lease for the exclusively use of a facility at Tacoma. By 
encouraging the carriers to commit themselves through investments and long-term leases, 
the likelihood of their re-location to another port, it is believed, will be reduced, and the 
capital costs can be shared.  
 
However, there are problems to this solution (as any solution). One of the difficulties is 
that the Port has to give something to the shipping lines in return. This normally involves 
the lines being given greater control over operations through single-user occupancy. 
Many ports, including the Port of Vancouver, maintain multi-user facilities that achieve 
enviable throughputs, but do not permit one line to have exclusively rights. In order to 
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entice private investments then, these ports will have to consider single user or 
preferential-user occupancy as an alternative. This becomes very difficult for a local port 
authority and especially if there are many smaller lines requiring berths and all the prime 
sites have been leased to larger ones.  
 
But although ports, as I said in the beginning, are now considered as one of many links in 
the logistical chains, there are still opportunities to exploit in order to be competitive. 
Including that of Vancouver. These opportunities require ports to become even more 
deeply involved in physical distribution systems; inventory control, security, data 
management, packing and processing. These will not come to the ports by themselves but 
only through careful planning and policies being promoted. For this reason, then, it seems 
to me that the local port authority in Vancouver must play a much more decisive role than 
before, that is, to become a catalyst for the port development. Or a “cluster-manager” as 
de Langen calls it. This is not a function most landlord port authorities have been used to 
but in order to accommodate the kind of growth the Port of Vancouver expects and to 
avoid further congestions in the Lower Mainland communities, the VPA is to a certain 
extent, “forced” to act as a ‘facilitator-voice’ in the transport chains in addition to their 
traditional landlord role. They are indeed in an excellent position to play a leading role in 
such initiatives as the pivotal location for international movements. And today’s 
competitive realities demand leadership. Their interest generally concerns the overall 
efficiency and growth of trade rather than the performance of particular sectors. The VPA 
should therefore constantly rethink and broaden their role as facilitator. Initiative, co-
operation and consultation constitute the key words underlying a proactive port 
management strategy. This means creating a platform in which the VPA is working 
together with its various stakeholders (carriers, shippers, transport operators, labour and 
government bodies) to identify and address issues affecting logistics performance. The 
pro-active Rotterdam port authority provides an excellent example here which is both 
actively involved with private industries in developing distribution and in logistic 
services on port land adjacent to the docks. In Table 8.3 below a distinction between two 
types of justifications for investments of port authorities is made: justification with 
reference to the role of port authorities as landlords, and reference to the role of port 
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authorities as cluster managers. Investments justified with reference to the landlord role 
are those investments that a) improve the quality and safety of the transport node and b) 
are recovered directly from the shippers and terminal operators. Investments on top of the 
landlord investments however, are justified from the perspective that a port authority is 
also a cluster manager (de Langen 2004b). Table 8.3 also shows examples of investments 
whose costs can be recovered with direct charges and investments that need to be 
financed in an indirect manner. 
 
Table 8.3: The Role of Port Authorities as Cluster Managers 
Role of port authority Direct cost recovery Indirect cost recovery 
Investments in port 
cluster (location) 
Hinterland terminals (dry ports) 
Industrial pipeline infrastructure 
Logistics zones 
Dedicated freight transport systems 
Venture capital provision 
Office space provision 
Web-based port community system 
ICT system for commodity trade 
Innovation platforms and research 
projects 
Training and education 
infrastructure 
Promotion port as working 
environment 
Investments in 
transport node 
Quay construction 
Land reclamation and development 
Cargo handling equipment 
Traffic control 
Dredging 
Waste collection 
Port security 
Port marketing and promotion 
Source: P. de Langen (2004b:117) 
 
However, while there is scope for the port to adopt new competitive strategies, it must be 
recognized that their present and administrative structure is a major impediment. The 
shipping lines are able to play one port off against another simply because of the 
independence ports enjoy in many jurisdictions around the world. As autonomous bodies, 
the Port of Vancouver, as everyone else, is guided ultimately by self-interest, and thus 
allows themselves to become, to use Slack’s expression, pawns in the global game played 
by “the vagabonds” [the shipping lines] looking for the best deal.  One solution to this 
problem might be for the national government to exert even greater control over 
Vancouver’s port development. That is, by rationalizing public capital investments and 
by subjecting all development proposals to a national review agency, it might be possible 
to prevent the duplication of facilities and to plan port development more efficiently. 
However, it is, from my point of view, very unlikely that the present political in most 
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countries, - including Canada, would allow a tightening of state control over ports, 
especially since deregulation, privatization and decentralization are extremely powerful 
forces that are reinforcing the independence of the port administrations world-wide. It is 
for that reason several port authorities in North America have proposed setting up 
informal arrangements, i.e. The Canada-Asia Maritime Conference in Vancouver (2006), 
whereby all elements of the logistics supply chain from shippers and carriers to ports, 
terminal operators and freight forwarders, as well as government officials on the same 
maritime range meets to discuss matters of common concern, and, it is hoped, to 
coordinate investment decisions more fully. That is, how to cope with burgeoning 
Canada-Asia Trade, private-public partnerships agreements, discuss initiatives that are 
being developed to deal with port congestions and surface transportation bottlenecks and 
finally, look at the best way to develop an efficient, collective integrated transportation 
system that can capture growth opportunities in Asia. “We have no time in British 
Columbia for our ports to be competing with one another. Rather it’s time to reach out 
and compete against the ports in Long Beach and the Ports of Seattle. And frankly, I 
don’t want our ports fighting one another, I want our ports fighting the competition which 
is south of the border and up and down the coast” said Premier Gordon Campbell to the 
Daily Post (7 Febr. 2005). Whether cooperation like this is helpful or not in order to 
facilitate the forecasted container growth, however, remains to be seen. It would appear 
to make sense, particularly now that the lines themselves are coming together to operate 
services jointly in some markets. Perhaps the ports can follow suit. 
 
An alternative solution therefore might be to privatize the port as a major difficulty for 
public-owned ports as the Port of Vancouver is to achieve profits. Given the fact that in 
practice no major general cargo port on mainland is in a monopoly situation, the need for 
public control (and investment) no longer exists. Experience from Britain, where private 
ports such as Felixstowe are very successful, clearly demonstrates that the public interest 
can be well served by privately owned installations (Slack 1993). But this is not to say 
that port privatizations have been without problems. There have in fact been a number of 
incidents of privatizations involving ports that have not worked out. It is not a surprise 
therefore that fully privatized ports (which often take the form of a private service port) 
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are few in number as full privatization is considered as an extreme form of port reform. It 
suggests that the State no longer has any meaningful involvement or public policy 
interest in the port sector. In fully privatized ports, port land is privately owned, contrary 
to the situation in other port management models. This requires the transfer of ownership 
of such land from the public to the private sector. Additionally, along with the sale of port 
land to private interests, some governments may simultaneously transfer the regulatory 
functions to private successor companies. In the absence of a port regulator in the UK, for 
example, privatized ports are essentially self-regulating. The risk in this type of 
arrangement is that port land can be sold or re-sold for non-port activities, thereby 
making it impossible to reclaim for its original maritime use (World Bank, 2002). 
 
The problem in B.C., however, is that many public port authorities such as the Port of 
Vancouver exert enormous political power. It would for that reason require very strong 
political will to privatize the present structure, as attractive as that solution might appear 
in removing public financial commitments in a period of dwindling public resources. 
Furthermore, if privatization were pursued as a policy option, the elected officials would 
have to anticipate the financial collapse of some ports, with the resultant political 
backlash. But more interesting, would all of the challenges and difficulties the Port of 
Vancouver is facing be solved any better if they get privatized? That is, would the 
congestions and bottlenecks disappear? Other challenges? Probably not. An intermediate 
policy option, therefore, might be to leave the Port of Vancouver under public control as 
it is today, but with the stipulation of greater governmental financial probity and private 
sector investment in port operations. It has been widely demonstrated that use of private 
sector companies throughout the range of port operations provides an opportunity to 
eliminate traditional, bureaucratic operating procedures and controls, and modernize 
facilities and equipment through new financing channels (Slack, 1993). But more 
important, by passing the reins of port operations from the public to the private sector, 
privatization offers the ability to shift the financial burden of port expansion and 
development to the beneficiaries of the expenditures. There are in fact numerous success 
stories where port authorities have transferred to the private sector operations previously 
performed by public employees according to the World Bank (2002). In Buenos Aires, 
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for example, the award of terminal concessions to four competing companies in 1994 has 
brought down handling charges significantly through improved labor productivity. After 
transferring major port facilities to the private sector between 1995 and 1998, Panama 
attracted more than $380 million in investments for modernization and expansion (!) 
(World Bank 2002). 
 
But this is not to say that port privatizations have been without problems (World Bank 
2002). There have in fact been a number of incidents of privatizations involving ports 
that have not worked out. In Indonesia for instance, the Koja container terminal under 
private management ran into difficulties and the public port company took back the 
facilities. The city of Rostock has demanded return of the terminal it contracted to a 
private group for operation, citing lack of compliance with the original contract. 
Following a dispute with the Port Authority of Trieste, the commercial terminal operator 
(Europe Combined Terminals - ECT) selected to operate the container terminal in the 
port under a 30-year contract withdrew from the contract after eighteen months. The 
terminal operator awarded the concession to operate the container terminal in the Port of 
Rosario is reported to have lost more than $40 million under the contract as a result of 
work disputes and has cancelled the contract (World Bank, 2002). And unfortunately, the 
success story in Kipevu in Panama as mentioned above became reversed when the 
commercial terminal operator terminated its contract with the port as a result of 
breakdown of equipment that the government failed to refurbish or replace. But if the 
Port of Vancouver is going to succeed in the immediate future, they have to think “big”. 
And more important, they have to make better use of the private leader firms. Otherwise 
they will be ousted.  
 
8.5 Conclusion  
 
The Port of Vancouver is being confronted by enormous challenges today, as the 
container revolution continuous to mature. Ports have become just one set of links in 
multimodal transportation chains. The old determinants of competition have changed, as 
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ports are finding that they no longer control their own destinies. Developments in 
maritime space, reflected in the activities of the mega ocean carriers, now influence port 
traffic to a great degree.  
 
This chapter has argued that the solutions do not lie in ports seeking to out equip each 
other to retain and attract traffic. Rather, the solutions that are suggested require the Port 
of Vancouver to develop competitive strategies to meet the challenges of intermodalism 
and the evolving distribution systems. That is, they have to reach out to all of their 
partners in the Canadian transportation system — to private industry, governments, 
labour, shippers and even communities — to change the way they manage the logistic 
chain. If not, the Port of Vancouver won’t be a reliable and competitive gateway for 
Asia-Pacific trade, or being able to achieve the growth targets the Port has set for 
themselves. In other words, the Port of Vancouver needs a change in both purpose and 
organization to ensure greater stability and commitment.  
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9. Final Comments 
 
 
In the very beginning of my fieldwork I attended the Vancouver Board of Trade 
conference “Developing the Pacific Gateway Strategy”. The predicted conclusion for 
each contribution, and for the summary of the day, was that the Port of Vancouver needs 
to think “big” in order to compete, grow and capture a share of international trade; “none 
of us should be satisfied with five per cent of our trade taking place with the world’s 
fastest-growing economy” (Houston, Vancouver Board of Trade 2005). The evolution in 
Canadian regions and local communities is undoubtedly affected by global changes. 
What is interesting, however, is how the Port of Vancouver will act in accordance with 
these changes, and to what extent they can control the changes themselves.  
As early as in 1997 Ståle Seierstad stated that the local and regional dimensions in the 
economic life crumble when meeting today’s global markets and that business policy 
needs to take measures to link enterprises to national and international networks 
(Seierstad 1997). While Seierstad’s approach in many ways reflected the polarized debate 
about globalization versus regionalization (which I referred to in the beginning of the 
thesis) this study is based upon an understanding of cooperative processes and structures 
in which the local port-community is considered to be a phenomenon that is being 
continuously developed through its actors and that responds to global and national 
processes. 
 
I have, for this reason, throughout the thesis argued that the making of new and further 
competitive advantages through collective strategies is a way to act proactive on the 
global arena. For paradoxically, as Porter (1998b) puts it, “the enduring competitive 
advantages in a global economy are often heavily local, arising from concentrations of 
highly specialized skills and knowledge, institutions, rivals, related businesses and 
sophisticated customers in a particular region”.  
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9.1 Conclusion 
 
With this thesis the author has tried to follow a method for social science research based 
on what Askildsen (2002:267) describes a “two-route strategy between the abstract and 
the concrete” in search for basic concepts that drive the seaport cluster in British 
Columbia’s Lower Mainland. That is, how the increasing transpacific container trade 
with Asia shapes the port’s expansion plans and other economic activities, and, of course, 
how competitive strategies are being created.  
 
According to this particular method of research, the labour of conceptualization follows a 
route of abstraction, where objects and phenomena – already conceptualized and with 
some “proto-theory” attached to them - are re-conceptualized in order to reveal their 
essential constitutive elements, their emergent powers according to Askildsen. But 
unfortunately (for me and others) Sayer (1992) never gave a recipe on how to actually 
practice abstraction; he only provided a partial guidance in “Methods in Social Science”. 
“[..]This leaves us with the impression that no matter how to remote from daily life 
outlay of the method can seem to be, there is something explicitly practical about the 
abstraction process: picking out objects and phenomena, tossing and turning them 
around, and tearing them apart in a search for what they are actually made up of” 
(Askildsen 2002:267).  
The aim of this thesis has been to investigate how the increasing transpacific container 
trade affects the Port of Vancouver and in what way the local port authority (VPA) is 
responding. That is, traditionally, a seaport was viewed as a transit area; a gateway 
through which goods and people move from and to the sea (Hazendonck 2001). As such, 
it was a place of contact between land and maritime space, a knot where ocean and inland 
transport lines meet and intertwine an inter-modal place of convergence (see Weigend 
1958, Hayuth 1985). But in the course of time -as this thesis has demonstrated- 
fundamental changing processes have broadened and deepened the functions of sea ports. 
The modern sea port has in fact evolved from a pure transshipment centre to “a function 
in a logistics system” in a broader technological system. For this reason, as stated in 1.3, 
seaports can be regarded as ‘text-book cases’ of clustering as these regions attract 
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substantial numbers of port related firms. I have therefore chosen to draw upon a 
modified Porterian cluster- and governance theory on the suggestion of Hazendonck 
(2001) and de Langen (2004b) in analyzing the Port of Vancouver community as Porter’s 
cluster metaphor is highly generic in character. That is, being deliberately vague and 
sufficiently indeterminate as to admit a very wide spectrum of industrial groupings and 
specializations (from footwear clusters to biotechnology clusters), demand-supply 
linkages, factor conditions, and institutional set-ups, while at the same time claiming to 
be based on what are argued to be fundamental processes of business strategy and 
economic interaction. The second reason why I chose to make use of Porter’s cluster 
approach is simply because spatial clustering is at the very hard core of what research in 
economic geography is all about (see 1.3). Thirdly, the analysis of seaport governance is 
often limited to the role of the port authority and the appropriate mix of public and 
private investments. Notwithstanding the central role of port authorities, these are but one 
‘actor’ that aims at improving the quality of collective action regimes in port clusters. 
Other actors, e.g. leader firms and branch associations, as demonstrated in this thesis, can 
also be important for the governance of change in port clusters. The application of the 
cluster concept has therefore resulted in more clarity on clustering in seaports (see Ch. 6);  
1. It has become clear that the Port of Vancouver might be considered as a seaport 
cluster. In Vancouver, the port cluster consists of substantial numbers of firms, all 
related to the arrival of ships and goods in seaports. The majority of value added 
and employment in the cluster is not generated in primary port activities (cargo 
handling), but in related activities, such as logistics, manufacturing and trade 
concentrated in the seaport or nearby.  
2. It is possible to identify a port cluster region. Vancouver’s port activities are 
distributed over a number of municipalities and not limited to the port city.  
3. A ‘general’ list of cluster activities can be compiled. Such a list consists of all 
firms active in cargo handling, transport and logistics, and manufacturing and 
trading firms in a small number of ‘chains’ such as chemicals and grain, and can 
be used to compare port clusters worldwide (i.e. B.C. Ports Handbook 2005). 
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For more than a century, the Port of Vancouver has played a vital role in fostering trade 
for the region and the country as well as providing a wealth of employment and economic 
benefits. Today, the Port with its community and business partners is building stronger 
national and international business relationships, more efficient ways to work with the 
nation’s infrastructure and strategic plans to develop port property. The future holds great 
promise; before them lie tremendous potential to capture economic growth and prosperity 
as a result of increasing Asia-Pacific trade. China, in particular, is reshaping the world 
economy and the Port of Vancouver is in a unique position to harness the resulting 
opportunities. However, capturing the tremendous economic potential requires a good 
plan and the support of their communities and all levels of government. But more 
important, it requires improved and new terminal facilities. For this reason, as shown in 
Ch. 7, five different terminal infrastructure projects are either planned or underway at the 
Port of Vancouver (in addition to several improvements), which will increase the Port of 
Vancouver’s terminal capacity by 3.6 million TEUs to a total of 5.3 million TEUs. 
Globalization has therefore led to a paradoxical situation. Adjustments to the 
globalization phenomena must necessarily take place at the local level.  
 
But even though the Port of Vancouver responds to the increased demands of private 
shipping companies with new terminals sites, dredging approach channels, and new 
gantry cranes, a major effect is that the local port authority find themselves less and less 
in control of their destinies as their clients of long standing are demonstrating little 
loyalty in maintaining their business activities in the port due to consortium and 
partnership agreements among private-owned port clients. The fact that shipping 
companies are operating in a freer, deregulated environment than the publicly-owned 
seaports means that these companies may switch their network operations to the benefit 
of their finances as opposed to the satisfaction of any regulation of operations imposed by 
governments. The Port of Vancouver has in other words become a pawn in a game of 
commerce, - global in scale and in which the major players are private container 
corporations whose interests rarely coincide with the local concerns of the port 
administrations.
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Simon Fraser 
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Roger Hayter Simon Fraser 
University (SFU) 
Professor, Department of 
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Inc. 
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Nina Schwarck Oldendorff Carriers Operations Manager Nov. 25th,  2005 
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David Cook Oldendorff Carriers Chartering Manager Nov. 25th,  2005 
Graham Baxter Star shipping Director Atlantic 
 
Nov. 25th,  2005 
Bill Corsan Vancouver Port 
Authority 
MCIP, Planner Nov. 28th,  2005 
Susan Buss Vancouver Maritime 
Museum 
Librarian Nov. 29th,  2005 
Erik Knoph Gearbulk Shipping 
Canada Ltd. 
Manager, Business & 
System Developer  
Nov. 30th,  2005 
Blake Pottinger Anglo Canadian 
Shipping Company 
President & CEO 
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Frank A. Pasacreta British Columbia 
Maritime Employers 
Association 
(BCMEA) 
President & Chief 
Executive Officer 
Dec. 5th,    2005 
Bonnie Gee Chamber of Shipping 
of British Columbia 
Manager, Member 
Services & Development 
Dec. 5th,   2005 
Erik Knoph Gearbulk Shipping 
Canada Ltd. 
Manager, Business & 
System Developer 
Dec. 8th,   2005 
Stephen Brown Gearbulk Shipping 
Canada Ltd. 
Acting General Manager Dec. 8th,  2005 
Dennis A. Bickel Vancouver Port 
Authority 
P.Eng. Manager, 
Logistics 
Dec. 9th,   2005 
Chris Badger Vancouver Port 
Authority 
Vice President, Customer 
Development and 
Operations 
Dec. 12th, 2005 
R.V. Bob Wilds Greater Vancouver 
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Managing Director 
(Previous President & 
CEO of the BCMEA) 
Dec. 12th, 2005 
Ruth Sol Western 
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Advisory Council 
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President Dec. 12th, 2005 
 
- 6 additional informants wanted to be anonymous.  
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A2: Interview Guide – an Example  
 
Issue Hypothesis (potential 
additional questions) 
Issues for expert 
interviews  
General P1: Differences in the governance 
of a cluster have an effect of the 
performance of port clusters. 
P1a: The development of port 
clusters is a result of the interplay 
of market forces and 
(inter)national policies. The 
quality of local governance does 
not have a substantial effect on 
performance. 
a) What actors play a role in the 
governance of the port? 
  
b) What is the institutional 
structure of the port cluster? 
Trust P2: The level of trust can vary 
between port clusters. Trust 
lowers transaction costs and thus 
contributes to the performance of 
a port cluster. 
 
 
a) Is there a culture of trust in the 
port community?  
b) How, and in what way? 
c) What about reputation effects? 
Presence of leader firms P3: The presence of embedded 
leader firms adds to the 
performance of port clusters 
 
a) Who are the leader firms? Why 
these?  
b) Is it their strategy to have a 
positive impact on the cluster as a 
whole? 
 
Quality of solutions for 
CAP’s (collective action 
problems) 
 
 
P4: The quality of solutions to 
collective action problems 
influences the performance of the 
port cluster. 
P5: The collective action problem 
in seaports is relevant for the 
issues 
innovation, education and 
training, marketing and 
acquisition, 
internationalization and 
hinterland access. 
Experts are asked to indicate 
whether the five CAP’s are 
present, the importance of these 
CAP’s and the quality of the 
solutions to these CAP’s. 
 
a) What forms of cooperation 
have developed in seaports? 
b) How do actors try to create 
coalitions to solve CAP’s? 
c) To what extent do port 
authorities act as cluster 
managers? 
 
 
 
